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Abstract 
This thesis examines the process of gradual political centralisation in Nigeria from 
the colonial period until today. It argues that since the formation of Nigeria in 1914, 
there has not been an effective state administrative structure in the governing of the 
nation. Pre-independence Nigeria (1888–1960) was characterised by a flawed 
structure put in place by the British colonial administration and the changes 
implemented by the successive military regimes and associated constitutional 
developments that followed independence have not changed the underlying problems 
established during this period.  
Traditional approaches to political decentralisation in developing countries generally 
involve delegation, devolution and deconcentration. However, the role of traditional 
institutions in a decentralised governance structure is not always made explicit. 
Rather the potential roles of traditional institutions are assumed to be part of the local 
administrative system (e.g. local governments). As a result, they are defined as part of 
the governance process. This limits applicability of these models to a country as 
ethnically diverse as Nigeria. The central argument put forward in this thesis is that 
an ideal decentralised administrative system is practicable in Nigeria only if the 
traditional institutions actively participate in the governance of the country. However, 
a review of the administrative system for the period 1914-2005 shows that the powers 
of the traditional institutions have been eroded over time.  
The thesis concludes by proposing a model for decentralising the complex 
administrative structure of Nigeria through ‘institutional reconciliation’. The model 
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follows previous approaches, but proposes a separation of the traditional institutions 
from both the administrative and governmental units (federal, state and local 
government). The thesis argues that the legitimacy of policies undertaken by any of 
the government units rests on these policies being consistent with ethnic, religious 
and cultural beliefs. It proposes one means of putting in place such a form of 
‘institutional reconciliation’ while highlighting the potential problems that may also 
result. 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
Political decentralisation refers to the transfer of authority and responsibility from 
central to intermediate and local governments. In practice political decentralisation 
may entail the transfer of certain planning, financing and management tasks to units 
of central agencies (‘deconcentration’), to lower levels of government (‘devolution’), 
or to autonomous authorities (‘delegation’). 
A feature of political decentralisation is that it alters the structure and systems of 
governance and the relationships between various levels of government and a range 
of social institutions. While deconcentration and delegation imply a reorganisation of 
central government, devolution means relinquishing political power (De Mello & 
Barenstein, 2001). When this geographical distribution of government institutions is 
absent in a state and the decision-making powers are in the hands of a small group of 
people in the capital, it is then referred to as centralisation.  
This style of administrative governance is very common in most developing 
countries, including Nigeria. Nigeria has been under this system of centralised 
administrative governance since 1914 when the northern and the southern 
protectorate were coaxed under a single administrative control by the colonial 
government. Since then, the country’s administrative system has shown that its 
capacity to operate a decentralised federal system has been hampered by the rigidity 
and imbalance in the country’s structure. Attempts to decentralise on many occasions 
have been thwarted through different political strategies. Some political leaders have 
capitalised on a malfunctioning system to mismanage resources under state control.  
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This thesis explores the flaws in the current and past federal structures in Nigeria and 
proposes an administrative system in which traditional institutions are incorporated 
into the federal and state government.  
1.1 Background 
In the late 15th century, Portuguese navigators became the first Europeans to visit 
Nigeria. They soon began to purchase slaves and agricultural produce from coastal 
middlemen. The Portuguese were followed by British, French, and Dutch traders. A 
number of city-states were established by individuals among the Igbo and Ibibio 
peoples who had become wealthy by engaging in the slave trade. Uwechue (2004) 
noted that first contact with Europeans was in 1486 when the Portuguese visited the 
Bright of Benin and penetrated inland into the heart of the kingdom of Benin, with 
the English arriving later in 1539 (p.3). 
There were major internal changes in Nigeria in the 19th century. In 1804, Usuman 
dan Fodio, a Fulani and a pious Muslem, began a holy war to reform the practice of 
Islam in the north. He soon conquered the Hausa city-states and maintained its 
independence. Usuman dan Fodio’s son established a state centred at Sokoto, which 
controlled most of northern Nigeria until the arrival of the British. 
Nigeria’s current borders were determined by European colonial powers at the Berlin 
conference in 1885 when Africa was arbitrarily demarcated and the coastal area 
where Nigeria is now situated was entrusted to Britain. This was as a result of the 
presentation by the British of signed treaties collected from the people of these 
regions. The inhabitants of these areas were Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo and other 
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tribes. The major livelihoods of these tribes were farming and the rearing of animals, 
along with trade in agricultural commodities including palm oil, yams, pepper, cocoa 
and groundnuts with the Europeans after the collapse of the slave trade (Agbodeka 
1974, pp. 72 & 89).  
Nigeria was apportioned to Britain for administrative purposes in order to facilitate 
their economic activities and transportation of commodities from regions for onward 
shipment to Britain by sea. The encroachment of the British government on Yoruba 
land resulted in the Lagos government signing treaties with the traditional rulers (the 
Alaafin) who put all Yoruba land under the British protection. The Yoruba 
protectorate and the Lagos Colony were then jointly administered as the Colony and 
Protectorate of Lagos.  
Following a series of confrontations with the Alaafin over several years, the British 
were able to exert authority and extended their control to the southern portion of the 
Niger territories. The British then amalgamated this territory with the Colony and 
Protectorate of Lagos, so that all of southern Nigeria came under one administration 
as the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Lagos became the headquarters 
of the whole region.  
Effective British control of northern Nigeria was achieved after three years of hard 
fighting with the emirates and in 1900 the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria was 
established, with Lord Lugard as the first high commissioner. With the conquest of 
the northern Nigeria accomplished, Lord Federick Lugard then amalgamated the 
southern and the northern parts of Nigeria in 1914.  
4 
The differences between the peoples from different regions were not considered in 
establishing these structures. However, while the British Colonial authority did 
nothing to integrate these different political units, the Richards Constitution of 1946 
did recognise three regions—the northern, western and eastern regions, along with the 
Colony of Lagos. Affirming this view, Okhaide (1996) declares that: 
The colonisation of Nigeria brought about the unification of these diverse 
groupings into a single geo-political entity now known as the Nigerian state 
without due regards to the district and autonomous existence of these 
groupings.… it has gone down as an important landmark in Nigerian political 
history and also formed the seed bed on which to be planted the seeds of 
Nigeria federalism (pp.10, 25). 
Nevertheless, Nigerian nationalists were dissatisfied with the level of indigenous 
participation in government. This led to a number of constitutional reforms between 
1951 and 1957. These reforms saw the gradual federalisation of Nigeria’s unitary 
colonial state. As the prospects of independence became clearer, Nigerian politicians 
withdrew into their ethnic regions to mobilise support for competitive politics. 
Mutual fear and suspicion of domination among geo-ethnic groups generated intense 
pressure on the colonial administration for a federal Nigeria.  
In 1956, the eastern and western regions secured self-governing status, while the 
northern region’s self-government had to wait until 1959. By 1957, a political diarchy 
had been established which saw Nnamdi Azikiwe (from the Igbo tribe in the eastern 
part of Nigeria) became a ceremonial head of government. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
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from the Hausa tribe in the Northern region was made prime minister after a 
controversial general election of 1959. Nigeria was then granted its independence in 
1960.  
From 1960 until today, the Nigerian state has lurched from one political crisis to 
another, with a series of military coups, civil war and ethno-religious conflicts. This 
has been seen as a result of the centralised administrative structure of the country, 
which had its origins in the colonial administration before Nigeria gained 
independence (Kanu 2004).  
According to Ajayi (2003), the flawed administrative structure has had three serious 
implications: it has hindered development by disempowering and under funding local 
authorities; it has limited democratic participation to the mere casting of votes during 
elections; and it has fuelled corruption in the polity (p. 1).  
Conflict between the political parties and party conflict within the Action Group 
Party (AGP), which formed the official opposition in the federal parliament, 
dominated the first three years after independence. The leadership of the AGP 
favoured the adoption of democratic socialism but its leader, Obafemi Awolowo was 
jailed for treason. Amidst this confusion, the military under Major General Aguiyi 
Ironsi took power in February 1966 and implemented Decree No. 8, which 
transformed the country into a unitary state. The centralisation of Nigeria became 
more pronounced as a result of this decree, which unified the federal and regional 
civil services. Under this structure, the states were reduced to little more than 
administrative units of the federal government, while the federal government made 
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several uniform laws for the country. The federal government also operated a federal 
account system in which it controlled all funds raised through agriculture and mineral 
resources. This structure has prevailed regardless of whether civilian or military 
governments have been in power (Library of Congress 1991).  
The model of governance in Nigeria promotes a system in which the federal 
government has overwhelming power in all areas of political, economic and financial 
affairs, while the subordinate levels are tasked with implementing federal government 
policies and programs. This is a distortion of the usual practices of a federal system in 
which the fundamental and distinguishing characteristic is that neither the central nor 
the regional governments are subordinate to each other. Rather, the two are co-
ordinate and semi-independent. Local political activists and commentators such as 
Wole Sohinka and Anthony Enahoro have recognised this deceptive structure and 
have been calling for a sovereign national conference in which representatives of 
every ethnic group can discuss how they might share government in Nigeria. 
1.2 Justification for the study 
Despite decades of discussion, administrative governance in Nigeria remains highly 
centralised. The reason for this is that those in power have not adequately instituted a 
decentralised system that suits the traditional features, cultures, and socio-political 
and historical backgrounds of the Nigerian people. The amalgamation of the southern 
and northern protectorates by the British colonial government was undertaken 
without sufficient understanding of the differences between regions. The joining of 
two regions as one administrative system has resulted in the administrative 
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deficiencies that persist to today, as subsequent government officials, military officers 
and political leaders have maintained this structure. This thesis will propose a 
decentralised system that suits Nigerian society.  
1.3 Objective of the study and research questions 
This thesis examines the case for political decentralisation in Nigeria. According to 
many Nigerians, an over-centralised governing structure that vests enormous power 
in a winner-take-all central government is the major cause of political unrest and 
corruption in Nigeria. They stress that the defective administrative structure has 
hindered development and limited people’s participation in governance to the mere 
casting of vote during elections. Politicians seek government positions out of self-
interest, and some have embezzled and appropriated government funds while in 
office (Ajayi 2003, p. 1).  
General Olusegun Obasanjo, former military head of state and current president, 
argued in an interview in 1983 that democracy releases the total energy of all citizens 
for development. Its opposite, restraint, curtailment, suppression and oppression 
under authoritarian regimes, breeds resentment, apathy and withdrawal which 
releases negatives thoughts and tendencies that undermine social and economic 
development (Agbese 1988, p. 3). 
Within this strand of social critique, political writers like F. E Iyoha, Anthony 
Enahoro and Wole Shohinka have argued that the only way out of this political 
situation is to restructure the country’s administrative system. Therefore, the 
objective of this study is to: 
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(i) Explore the implications of the country’s imperfect federal structure.  
(ii) Propose an effective and flexible model for genuine federalism. 
The thesis concentrates on Nigeria’s defective constitution as well as the issue of 
resource control and the formula for the allocation of resources, which the federal 
government has used as a weapon to starve the subordinate units of funds thereby 
making them ineffective in performing their functions (Okafor 2004; Ossai 1999). 
The study also considers the differences and similarities between Nigeria’s federal 
system and that of federal systems in other democratic states. It proposes a model of 
decentralisation that would devolve power and resources and promote effective 
participation by marginalised people in Nigeria. 
The thesis has three main research questions: 
1. To what extent is a flawed federal structure and over-centralisation 
responsible for various forms of government failure? 
2. How adequate are the major existing models for decentralisation in 
addressing the problems identified? 
3. How in practice can decentralisation be achieved in a society as complex 
as Nigeria’s? 
1.4 Research methodology 
The methodology adopted in this study is a combination of exploratory and 
descriptive methodologies. Exploratory and descriptive approaches are useful for 
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examining current models of decentralisation and practice, with the aim of 
developing an alternative model that is considered more consistent with the cultural, 
historical, socio-economic and political realities in Nigeria.  
The exploratory approach ‘attempts to seek preliminary understanding of a topic, or a 
situation when little is known about a particular topic, and also conducted to develop 
or define and to test hypothesis. By contrast, the descriptive approach ‘attempts to 
describe systematically a situation, problem, phenomenon, services or program or 
provides information about…. the living conditions of a community or society or 
describes attitudes towards issues’ (Fortune and Reid 1999, p. 446).  
Exploratory and descriptive strategies have many similarities and are compatible with 
each other (Neuman 1994, p. 19). Given the research questions to be addressed in this 
study, it was necessary to explore and describe in detail the federal system of Nigeria 
in order to provide a well-grounded picture of the degree of centralisation and the 
level of corruption and governance failure in Nigeria. This will provide an insight 
into the nature of federalism and political practices in Nigeria, as well as help assess 
the appropriateness of a federal system and practices, and provide scope for future 
research. 
A historical approach is also used to better understand the origins of the current 
federal system in Nigeria, and the nature of past debates about constitutional reform. 
Gay defines historical research as ‘the collection and evaluation of data related to past 
events and occurrences in order to test hypotheses concerning causes, effects, or 
trends of those events that may help to explain present events and anticipate future 
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events’ (cited in Fraenkel and Wallen 1996, p. 145). This involves defining the 
problem, locating relevant sources, summarising information obtained from sources 
and evaluating the available sources (Fraenkel and Wallen 1996). Historical failures 
and can be considered in terms of their applicability to current problems and 
concerns. They can help in prediction, in testing hypotheses concerning relationships 
and trends, and in understanding present practices and policies more fully (Fraenkel 
and Wallen 1996).  
In this regard, the study is based on existing literature on the subject. This involves 
examining what has already been written on the subject and also providing fresh 
insight into solving the problem. This method is based to a large extent on secondary 
sources: textbooks (political histories and political theory on federalism), 
international organisation reports, journal and magazine articles, and newspaper 
reports. Government documents have also been used. 
The focus of my analysis is successive governments, civilian and military regimes, 
that have ruled Nigeria from inception to 2005. This is because each government, 
regardless of constitution, has maintained the centralised administrative structure in 
the federal system, with only minor modifications. The argument will be that the 
centralisation of power has contributed to the emergence of corrupt government 
officials in Nigeria, while the citizens of the country have been made more distant 
from the government. 
Hill and Kerber observe that historical methods (a) enables solutions to contemporary 
problems to be sought in the past; (b) throws light on present and future trends; (c) 
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stresses the relative importance and the effects of the various interactions that are to 
be found within all cultures; and (d) allows for the revaluation of data in relation to 
selected hypotheses, theories and generalizations that are presently held about the 
past. As Hill and Kerber point out, the ability of history to employ the past to predict 
the future, and to use the present to explain the past, gives it a dual and unique quality 
which makes it especially useful for all sorts of scholarly study and research (Hill & 
Kerber, quoted in Cohen & Manion 1989, pp. 48 - 49). 
Parts of the thesis adopt the narrative form of traditional history by sequential telling 
of a story, the history of events and, inevitably, the history of those who act them out. 
Simon Schama, for example, used historical methods in Citizens, in which he studied 
the French Revolution as a connected and longitudinal story. Indeed, Schama claimed 
that his method was to return to the style of the nineteenth-century chronicles. His 
justification for this approach constituted a defence of narrative, stating that, ‘if, in 
fact, the French Revolution was a much more haphazard and chaotic event and much 
more the product of human agency than structural conditioning, chronology seems 
indispensable in making its complicated twists and turns intelligible’ (Cohen & 
Manion 1989, pp. 48-49).  
1.5 Limitations to the study 
The major limitation to the study has been in sourcing material with the researcher 
having to rely heavily on online materials such as newspaper articles, journals and 
other publications sourced from the Internet.  
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1.6 Thesis structure 
Chapter Two explores the major models of decentralisation and their relationship 
with each other. It will also illustrate how these models have been practiced in some 
countries and why these models have not put into practice in developing nations.  
Chapter Three presents the political history of Nigerian federalism and the processes 
that brought about centralisation. Its emphasis is on the different inhabitants living in 
the regions and their political, economic and social background, and how they related 
to each other with the imposition of indirect rule and constitutional development until 
independence in 1960.  
Chapter Four provides an overview of the country’s political development from 
independence and examines the circumstances that brought about the first military 
coup in Nigeria, and the role of military and civilian governments in maintaining a 
centralised administrative structure.  
Chapter Five explores the effects of centralisation, in particular corruption by 
government officials. It considers the deceptive behaviour of government officials in 
diverting government funds and the generation of a huge national debt. It also 
examines regional insecurity and how the states have agitated for greater control of 
resources, resulting in inter-regional tensions.  
Chapter Six discusses the activities of various institutions at the local levels. and 
considers the operations of these institutions as a model for good governance sin 
Nigeria. It also discusses the role of traditional institutions in the process of 
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decentralisation in Nigeria during the period covered in the study. It concludes this 
chapter by pointing out the limitations to the study.  
The conclusion summarises the arguments for incorporating traditional institutions 
the basis for a decentralised system of administration in Nigeria. 
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Chapter Two – Models of Decentralisation 
This chapter reviews the different models for political decentralisation and discusses 
how decentralisation might be achieved in Nigeria’s complex political system, in 
particular, how it could be applied to meet the interests of different ethnic 
nationalities. This chapter stresses the need for any political reform to reflect the 
diverse interests, political history, economy and religion of the inhabitants of the 
nation. To this end, I argue that decentralisation is essential, in order to integrate 
traditional institutions, along with traditional norms and values of various 
nationalities and regions into the governance structure.  
The alignment of administrative governance with traditional institutions and 
indigenous knowledge in Nigeria is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, 
which lies at the heart of European Union law. This principle states that matters ought 
to be handled by the smallest (or the lowest) competent authority. The principle of 
subsidiarity holds that government should undertake only those initiatives that exceed 
the capacity of individuals or private groups acting independently. This thesis argues 
that devolution to regional and local levels of government, which are more closely 
integrated with traditional power structures, would significantly improve the quality 
of governance in Nigeria. 
2.1 Participation 
Participation could be described as an umbrella term that includes different means for 
the public to directly participate in political, economical or management decisions in 
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an organisation or country. The absence of citizen participation in a developing nation 
like Nigeria has, to a very large extent, contributed to the problems of administrative 
governance in the country. The complex situation stems from the inflexible system of 
governments and corrupt practices of political leaders and government officials, 
which, I argue, has resulted from the inability of government officials to imbibe the 
socio-political, economic and historical background of the nation’s people.  
As Turner and Hulme (1997) have noted, the geographical distance between the 
majority of the population and central government institutions is a major impediment 
to participation:  
A major obstacle to the effective performance of public bureaucracies in most 
developing countries is the excessive concentration of decision-making and 
authority within central government. Public sector institutions are commonly 
perceived to be geographically and socially remote from ‘the people’ and to 
take decisions without knowledge or concern about actual problems and 
preferences. The popular remedy for such centralisation is decentralisation, a 
term which is imbued with many positive connotations—proximity, 
relevance, autonomy, participation, accountability and even democracy (p. 
151). 
In recent years, a wide variety of transitional and developing countries have pursued 
decentralisation as a means of fully involving citizens in decision-making. It involves 
a central government transferring some of its political authority to local entities and, 
crucially, some of its resources and administrative responsibilities. These local 
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entities then provide some basic public services and functions. Multi-purpose local 
councils have been created for this purpose in many developing states (UNDP 2003a, 
p. 134). 
It is arguable that citizen participation in the local affairs in many developing 
countries is limited to the casting of votes at election time. Even under the civilian 
dispensation in most developing nations, participation could be said to be limited to 
the right to elect councillors and to co-produce services voluntarily without any legal 
authority. These arrangements may appear democratic but are deceptive. Manor 
(1999) posited that, ‘[c]ommunity contributions which provide people with no voice 
cannot be regarded as democratic, but when some form of supervision or influence is 
permitted, they have some democratic content’ (p. 9). Wide consultation and citizen 
participation, along with jurisdictions large enough to cope with the problems that 
pervade an entire area are imperative to the success of any democratically elected 
government.  
According to the United Nations Human Development Report (UNDP 2003),‘The 
contemporary understanding of participation is as a means to bring individuals close 
to social, economic, cultural and political processes which directly affect their lives 
and affords them the role of responsible citizens’ (p. 8). As citizens, people may have 
direct control over these processes, or in other cases the control may be only partial or 
indirect.  
Participation means that people are closely involved in economic, social, 
cultural and political processes that affect their lives…. the important thing is 
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that people have constant access to decision-making and power. Participation 
in this sense is an essential element of human development (UNDP 2003, p. 
93). 
The Skeffington Committee (UK), in their 1969 report on public participation in 
planning, put it this way: 
We understand participation to be the act of sharing in the formation of 
policies and proposals. Clearly, the giving of information by the local 
planning authority and of an opportunity to comment on that information is a 
major part in the process of participation, but it is not the whole story. 
Participation involves doing as well as talking and there will be full 
participation only where the public are able to take an active part throughout 
the plan-making process (p. 1). 
The key aspect of this philosophy is that citizens become equal partners with the 
government and collectively develop a state. It is commonly agreed that this type of 
relationship is most likely to create the conditions for high living standards, longevity 
and good educational opportunities. Thus participation is both a goal of human 
development and also a means for achieving it. The degree and type of participation 
are determined by the distribution of power in the society, hence participation and 
empowerment are linked aspects of development. Participation can be considered as 
two faces in one; it aims to develop the society and it also develops the person who 
participates by reinforcing their capabilities, their potential and their active and 
effective role in the society (UNDP 2003, p. 8). 
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An earlier UNDP reports elaborated on this point further: 
Participation from the human development prospective is both a means and 
end…Greater participation has an important role to play here…But human 
development is also concerned with personal fulfilment so, active 
participation, which allows people to realize their full potential and make their 
best contribution to society, is also an end in itself (UNDP 1993, p. 21). 
The concept of development in general and human development in particular focuses 
on raising the quality of life and increasing choice by improving the level of 
satisfaction of the individual in health, education and knowledge, and with the best 
use of the available resources. Consequently, the individual benefits from a larger and 
more equitable share of the domestic product.  
Invariably, each country has its own way of allowing for participation, in light of its 
circumstances and development requirements, while the degree and type of 
participation will be determined by the distribution of power in that society. As stated 
in the United Nations Human Development Report (UNDP 2003): 
Decentralisation efforts are strongly influenced by a country’s size population, 
history political climate and geographic and ethnic diversity. These 
differences call for different arrangements between central and subnational 
levels including devolution delegation and deconcentration (p. 137). 
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However, participation can only occur in an atmosphere of democratic governance, 
where grassroots participation is nurtured and every citizen is equally accountable in 
the society. 
Participation requires a social, economic and political context, which for most 
commentators is the manifestation of good governance. …It carries with it a 
powerful idea of democratic rule that relies on transparency, accountability 
and public participation. It is good governance that creates the political space 
and provides the means for people to participate in society and allows them to 
influence the decisions that may affect the way they live their lives. In this 
way citizens help to legitimize governance and governing institutions, while 
also guaranteeing that the objectives of government action truly meet the 
aspirations of the people (UNDP 2003, p. 3). 
The argument of this thesis follows that of scholars who argue that the issue is no 
longer whether citizen participation is desirable but what forms and processes of 
citizen participation are best suited to a specific situation (Irvin and Stansbury 2004). 
The thesis proposes a decentralised administrative system in Nigeria, which 
incorporates traditional institutions to foster grassroots participation. This would 
provide a sense of belonging for Nigerians, including those in rural areas. The already 
established system of ‘shadow states’ at the community level is a particular example 
explored.  
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2.2 Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is usually referred to as the transfer of power from the central 
government to lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy 
(Crook and Manors 1998; Agrawal and Ribot 1999). This official power transfer can 
take various forms. It could involve the transfer of ‘natural resources management to 
local individuals and institutions located within and outside government’ (Yuliani 
2003, p.3). It could also be referred to as the political or democratic transfer of 
authority to representative and downwardly accountable actors, such as elected local 
government, and administrative decentralisation, a process known as deconcentration. 
Another form is the delegation of managerial responsibility for specified functions to 
other public organisations outside normal central government control, whether 
provincial or local government or agencies.  
Nigeria experienced a form of decentralisation between 1967 and 1975 when twelve 
states were created out of the previous four regions. The number of states increased to 
nineteen in 1976, twenty-one in 1987 and thirty-six in 1991, with managerial 
responsibility transferred to the state and local governments for specific functions. 
2.3 Devolution 
Maddick defines devolution as ‘the legal conferring of powers to discharge specified 
or residual functions upon formally constituted local authorities’ (Iyoha 1999, p. 93). 
In a federal system this entails the sharing of powers or devolution of powers from 
the national to the state governments and then to the local authorities. Such territorial 
demarcations of authority have greater capacity to ensure efficient socio-economic 
21 
progress and a degree of power-sharing and democratic participation. It entails the 
downward transfer of power and resources to lower-level authorities which may be 
more democratic. As subdivisions of the state they are expected to be, within limits, 
autonomous self-governing and devoid of administrative agents of the central 
government. Iyoha (1999) adopts Rondinelli’s definition of the delegation of power 
as an ‘act whereby a political authority invested with certain powers turns over the 
exercise of those powers in full or in part, to another authority’ (p. 67). Countries 
such as Spain, Italy, South Africa and France have devolved powers via bicameral 
legislatures. For example, South Africa, a highly devolved political system, has its 
legislative power vested in a bicameral Parliament, comprising a National Assembly 
and a National Council of Provinces and represented on the basis of ten members 
from each provinces. Delegation is therefore seen as a more elaborate form of 
decentralisation than deconcentration.  
Nigeria devolves power to its subordinate bodies (state and local government) 
whenever these subordinates are created. The military regime between 1985 and 1993 
devolved power and resources to the state and direct finance to local government. 
However, devolution has not in practice enhanced democracy in most developing 
countries as it is often found to be a mere passing down of administrative 
responsibilities with little of the funding required to fulfil those responsibilities. 
Devolving decision-making to local authorities risks being an empty gesture unless 
backed by sufficient financial resources, administrative capacity and mechanisms for 
holding those authorities accountable. Manor (1999), argues that to be effective, 
decentralised systems must have: 
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Sufficient power to exercise substantial influence within the political system 
and over significant development activities; sufficient financial resources to 
accomplish important tasks; adequate administrative capacity to accomplish 
those tasks; and reliable accountability mechanisms…to ensure both the 
accountability of elected politicians to citizens, and the accountability of 
bureaucrats to elected politicians (p. 55). 
In doing so, the central government still holds a larger amount of power, allowing it 
to control and regulate the governmental processes for smooth administrative 
governance and development for the benefit of the people of any nation. Peck (1996) 
observes that: 
In shifting responsibilities and resources to lower tiers in the federal 
hierarchy, the national government still retains authority to set the direction 
for change, as this complex sub-national reconstitution of state power and 
regulatory structures is occurring within a set of political, discursive, and 
institutional parameters established by the national states (p. 3). 
Privatisation can result in devolution if it involves the transfer of government 
functions to commercial firms and non-profit organizations, thus substituting the 
private sector for components of the public sectors. Examples of the government’s 
encouragement of, and partnership with, the private sector include the establishment 
of quasi-government corporations (for example, the US Postal Service, Amtrak); the 
employment of private contractors (for example, for road construction and other 
forms of infrastructure); and the use of vouchers and subsidies to be spent in the 
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commercial sector (for example, food stamps, agricultural export incentives and rent 
subsidies) (Staeheli, Kodras and Fint, 1997, p. 81). 
Staeheli, Kodras and Flint (1997) also refer to dismantling as a form of devolution. 
This refers to the withdrawal of a government function no longer deemed appropriate 
for the state to provide (p. 82). Dismantling is accomplished through the outright 
elimination of programs or by the more convert mechanisms of cutting financial 
support, allowing funding to fall behind the cost of living, or complicating regulatory 
procedures to the point that administration oversight is rendered impossible. In the 
case of complete dismantling, the state reduces the scope of its activities, and these 
either cease to exist or fall to whomever will take responsibility. Private firms may 
see financial incentives to acquire government assets or services. Alternatively, 
responsibilities may fall to the domestic sphere. For example, the retraction of 
government responsibility for long-term health care in the US, via Medicaid, requires 
many households to assume responsibility for family members who are elderly or 
severely disabled, regardless of their financial ability or competence to do so. 
2.4 Deconcentration  
Deconcentration is the geographical dispersal of agents of the central governments 
into regional areas. In other word it is a mere shifting of administrative power to local 
offices of central government ministries, often with no financial backing.  
Iyoha (1999), points out that the officials who operate such offices enjoy 
deconcentrated or delegated powers. But they are functional powers favouring 
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privileges rather than rights, and they can be withdrawn or manipulated by the centre 
at will (p. 93).  
According to Manor (1999) when deconcentration occurs in isolation, or when it 
occurs together with fiscal decentralisation but without simultaneous 
democratisation—that is, when agents of higher levels of government move into 
lower arenas but remain accountable to only to persons higher up in the system—it 
enables central authority to penetrate more effectively into those arenas without 
increasing the influence of organised interests at those levels. In other words the 
central government has not given up any authority, it has simply relocated its officers 
at different levels or points in the national territory. It is effectively centralisation, 
since it enhances the leverage of those at the apex of the system. This is especially 
true in less developed countries 
Mawhood (1993) argues that: 
‘deconcentrated’ field offices takes most of its decisions—even major ones—
without being subject to local pressures, though it may sometimes enter into 
voluntary consultations with local notables. Demands from central 
government are much stronger than those from the local population and the 
field officer (less secure than his counterpart in the West) is constantly 
concerned to satisfy his political masters (pp. 2-3). 
Deconcentration, in many cases, can be seen as more of a necessity of governance 
than a real sharing of the power among the different levels. Historically, 
deconcentration, the weakest form of decentralisation, has appeared in many cases 
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and forms. Most of the time, certain forms of weak decentralisation work well in 
basically centralised systems; even socialist governments had different levels of 
government.  
Calvert (1975) posited: 
Central governments are always forced to distribute power and authority to 
subnational tiers of government Pragmatically, the power of government 
needs always to be distributed among a number of individuals if the business 
of government is to be carried on (p. 5). 
This is not only a feature of modern democracies but seems to be present in early 
historical times also. According to Calvert:  
Even the despot will need to vest authority in others if his position is to be 
sustained; he cannot personally collect all the taxes, punish all the criminals 
and, single-handed, wage a foreign war. In all but very small and simplest 
polities, then, authority needs to be distributed. (p. 5).  
While a distribution of power is a necessary feature of all governments, it has often 
been used as rhetoric in authoritarian and totalitarian systems, as being a form of 
democratisation.  
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1993) observed that: 
[in] most developing countries decentralisation has been limited to 
deconcentration. Even Chile, Indonesia, Morocco and Zimbabwe have
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dispersed relatively little real power. All four have ostensibly autonomous 
levels of local government … but the resources they control are small, their 
decision-making powers narrow and many local appointments are imposed 
from above (p. 257).  
Such countries are governed under the guise of a federal system when in practice key 
features of a genuine federal administrative system are absent. This style of 
governance, where power and resources are concentrated at the central government 
while the subordinates are mere implementers of their federal policies, is generally 
viewed as undemocratic. While it is clearly an aspect of it, decentralisation in the 
form of deconcentration is not a satisfying substitute for genuine devolution of central 
authority. When deconcentration produces, in effect, the opposite of decentralisation, 
it hardly warrants consideration in this study. But it can also be linked to mechanisms 
that give people at lower levels some voice in the decisions made within state 
institutions, and in those cases it can produce a degree of genuine decentralisation. 
Nigeria experienced this form of decentralisation during the first military government 
of Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon when twelve states were created, each having 
offices of federal ministries as representatives of the federal government.  
2.5 Decentralisation by default 
Decentralisation by default occurs when government institutions became so 
ineffective that they fail almost entirely to make the influence of central authorities 
penetrate to lower levels, such that people at the grassroots became cynical about 
government. When this occurs in countries with lively civil societies, voluntary 
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associations or non-governmental organisations at lower levels sometimes step in to 
generate development projects. Resources for such projects—which are either 
mobilised at local level or obtained from nongovernmental sources higher up—accrue 
to those groups and a kind of decentralisation, unintended by government, takes 
place.  
This decentralisation by default occurred in Nigeria when the Directorate of Foods 
Roads and Rural Infrastructure failed to yield any meaningful result, and the military 
regime of General Ibrahim Babagida in 1986, under the Structural Adjustment 
Program, encouraged organisations, voluntary or private establishments to provide 
certain services in the communities (Iyoha 1999, p. 95). 
2.7 Privatisation 
Privatisation involves the transfer of ownership or control from the public to the 
private sector, as well as changes in income flows between groups.  
Since 1999 Nigeria’s civilian government has been privatising its public enterprises 
Unfortunately, the process has been characterised by corrupt practices and those 
benefiting most are those with political and financial influence.  
2.8 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has examined the major models of decentralisation and their operations 
and effects. It has also discussed the relationship between these models and 
considered example of their practice. It argued that the effective practice of these 
28 
models is largely limited to developed nations and not developing countries such as 
Nigeria with complex and diverse natures.  
The above-described models of decentralisation which Nigeria had practiced under 
centralised administrative governance in an ethno- linguistic diverse nation are 
unlikely to function well when the institutions responsible for governmental activities 
are ineffective or poor. Hence, Dia’s (1996) reasoning that: 
The inherited disconnected system in which modern governance and public 
administration systems were superimposed on the traditional institutions and 
indigenous management system of civil society maintains neglect of local 
self-governance and therefore reintegrated (p. 43).  
In Nigeria’s case, therefore, an administrative system that accommodates traditional 
institutions that already have a strong support base at the local level is an alternative 
for consideration in subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter Three – The Process of Political Centralisation in Nigeria (1914 
– 1960) 
This chapter examines the historical origins of Nigerian political federalism. It 
discusses political, cultural, economic and social formation of the peoples living in 
these areas and how these groups related to each other before European colonial rule. 
It also discusses the causes for the imposition of indirect rule and its consequences, 
including the eventual union of northern and southern Nigeria under colonial rule. It 
further explains the effects of amalgamation on the people dwelling in these regions 
and the rise of nationalist leaders. It then discusses the country’s constitutional 
development up to independence in 1960. This chapter argues that the ethnic 
differences of the regions are incompatible with centralisation of the state and that 
this has led to many problems in governance and, further, that these could be 
alleviated if a decentralised system incorporating traditional institutions was adopted.  
This chapter draws on the work of Oyobvaire (1985), Okhaide (1996), Agbodeka 
(1965), and Elaigwu (2002), Eraikhuemen (2004) and a Library of Congress (1991) 
country study, to help analyse the development of Nigeria’s federal polity from 
colonial protectorate, through military rule and to civilian government. Each of these 
phases in Nigeria political development is considered in turn.  
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3.1 Pre-independence Nigeria 
Nigeria’s borders were set by Europe’s colonial powers when they roughly 
demarcated the African continent among themselves for economic interest. The 
Britain established control after it presented treaties it had signed with the people of 
these regions (Agbodeka 1965). These people had a long history prior to European 
occupation, which is now outlined. 
3.2 Hausa-Fulani states 
The rise of the Hausa states occurred between 400 and 800 AD, however, it was not 
until 1200 that they began to effectively control the region. The history of the area is 
intricately tied to Islam and the Fulani, who wrestled political power from the Hausa 
in the early 1800s following a series of religious wars. At the beginning of Hausa 
rule, the seven states of Hausa-land divided up production and labour activities in 
accordance with their location and natural resources. The Kano and Reno areas of the 
Hausa-land were known to be the major producers of cotton, weaving and dyeing it 
before it was sold to other states. Other areas produced groundnuts and reared 
animals.  
The political headquarters of the Hausas was Biram, while Zaria was the main source 
of labour. Other parts of the Hausa region, like Katsina and Daura, were strategically 
positioned for the market, while the Gobir area was responsible for protection of the 
region against invaders. The early Hausa rulers were the seven children of Bayinjida, 
and those who could trace their lineage back to Bayajidda (their founder) were 
accepted as royalty (Ndoh 1997). When Islam was introduced, many Hausa rulers 
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adopted this new religion while at the same time complying with traditional ways. 
These rulers later formed a centralised system of governance in the northern part of 
Nigeria.  
Hausa social life was in keeping with their religious belief and, as Muslims, they 
celebrated important dates in the Muslim calendar such as the Id-el-kabiri and Id-el-
Fitr. Following a series of religious wars or jihads, the northern part of what is 
today’s Nigeria was unified in the name of Islam under the auspices of the Fulani 
Empire between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries (Library of Congress 1991, p. 
2). 
3.3 Yoruba kingdom 
The origin of the Yoruba kingdom has it that Oduduwa, the ancestor of the Yoruba 
people, was brought to earth by God with a chain and directed his seven sons to form 
cities, which later became kingdoms.  
Each kingdom was ruled by an Oba whose bloodline could be traced to Oduduwa and 
had the blessing of senior chiefs, and who had under him a number of subordinate 
towns and villages. In terms of political administration, an Oba ruled with a council 
of chief and elders, and together they formed the administrative system. The main 
town was ruled by the Oba and the subordinate towns were ruled indirectly through 
the Baale or Oloja, whose appointment was approved by the Oba. 
The Council of Chiefs acted as a legislative assembly that deliberated on political, 
economic and socio-religious issues and made decisions on how to address them. The 
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Oba followed the advice of the elders and chiefs and any Oba who ruled 
autocratically was compelled to commit suicide through the presentation of an empty 
calabash. 
The judicial functions were performed both by the Oba and his most senior chiefs and 
strict adherence was paid to the basic patterns of people’s lives in judicial matters. 
The taboos and rules that governed the people were primary and had to be obeyed, 
while the Oba called on senior chiefs to meet and decide on punishment for 
transgressions.  
The Yoruba system of administration was, therefore a form of check and balance 
system with the Oba having executive legislative and judicial powers vested in him, 
with convention dictating a need to have dialogue with his chiefs before making 
decisions. Likewise, the chiefs were subject to checks by the people. 
The people of Yoruba were largely common farmers, predominantly growing cocoa 
and yams. The political style and social life varied in the different regions, but largely 
revolved around an urban centre in the area, rather than a singular central authority.  
3.4 Igbo society 
During the pre-colonial period Igbo society, unlike northern and western Nigeria, had 
no central government. The Igbo lived in a kind of stateless society, living in a small 
group of village-based communities with similar administrative structures and 
customs. The Igbos had no chiefs and some of them relied on oracles and deities to 
guide them. Farming was the major occupation and the social organisation was based 
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on an extended family with members bound by kinship. The head of every household 
represented the family in village meetings, while the most senior heads of families 
constituted the council of elders in each village. Decisions taken at the meetings of 
elders would be conveyed to the family by the elder representing them. 
The political historian Okhaide (1996) observed that: 
[t]he Igbo had a diffused decentralised traditional political system. A political 
system with power centred round the council of elders and village assemblies. 
A system where Kinship groups, aged group society played considerable roles 
in the governance of the society …. in the Igbo traditional system, no chief or 
traditional ruler had overwhelming control or could rule absolutely on behalf 
of the colonialist (p. 35). 
3.5 The role of traditional rulers 
Prior to colonial rule the Emirs, Obas, Obis and others chiefs had each established 
their own means of administering their regions and were able to maintain peace and 
order by preserving their own cultural traditions. During this period, there were 
effective judicial systems and accountability, and crime rates were low as there were 
mechanisms for maintaining law and order in the different regions. In the traditional 
administrative system, the region’s youth were effectively mobilized to police the 
communities and were also called upon to provide communal labour.  
Venson (1995) observed that: 
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Traditional leadership, in its form before external interference, operated on the 
principle of community participation, consultation, consensus, and an 
acceptable level of transparency through the village council or open tribal 
consultative meetings. These principles are not too different from the ones 
which modern democracies prescribe as essential for democracy! It might 
serve the purpose, therefore, that countries of Africa which are striving to gain 
good governance, should look with renewed detail to the role traditional 
governance and the aspirations of new democracies the world over (p. 2). 
Despite the marginalisation of traditional rulers in Nigeria’s government, they are still 
very powerful at the local level and are often called upon by the government to appeal 
to people in their regions for calm and co-operation with government authorities.  
3.6 Indirect rule 
Indirect rule was ‘the British policy which enabled the British official or colonial 
administrators to team up with the chiefs in order to govern the colonial people 
effectively and efficiently’ (Oyebola 1971, p. 177). It began in 1900, when Federick 
Lugard was appointed high commissioner to northern Nigeria after having served in 
India, Egypt and East Africa. Lugard realised there existed an established system of 
rulership in the region, with the Sultan of Sokoto Caliphate regarded as the spiritual 
and religious head. The Sultan was held in high esteem and had Emirs that ruled other 
emirates who reported to him. This well-arranged traditional system of rulership, 
along with the size of the new territory and its population, prompted Lugard to 
implement a system of indirect rule. This also addressed the shortage, if not complete 
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absence, of subordinate clerical and technical staff and artisans to help establish the 
new administration, as well as the lack of an effective communication system 
(Momodu 2004). In particular, the British faced a shortage of labour for extending the 
frontiers of free trade and commerce. They were also anxious not to do anything 
which might be construed as interference with the right of Muslims to the practice 
their religion. 
Lugard introduced a system of indirect rule in northern Nigeria to allow the colonial 
rulers to govern the inhabitants of the regions via their traditional rulers. Britain was 
more interested in the economic exploitation of her west African colonies than in 
establishing extensive governance structures surplus to their requirements. According 
to Okhaide (1996): 
Lord Lugard who first introduced indirect rule in West Africa, assured the 
traditional rulers that they would continue to rule in the same old ways while 
maintaining their culture and tradition but that in return the traditional rulers 
would obey all instructions of the colonial government through the colonial 
representatives.… the reasons for the introduction of the system of indirect 
rule was that the geographical area of Nigeria was very large and unknown to 
the colonialists; the British officials were too few to make direct rule feasible; 
it was a cheaper means of administration for the British whose policy was that 
territories should be able to pay for the cost of administering the areas in 
question; the means of communication was poor; there was language barrier; 
the native political institution particularly that of the northern part of Nigeria 
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and the Western part were suitable for its practice. The British government 
did not want to disrupt or interfere with the culture of the people within its 
British territory (p. 34).  
Indirect rule succeeded to varying degrees in all regions of Nigeria. In the north 
where powerful autocratic emirates had existed before the British rule, indirect rule 
was very successful and therefore characterised British colonial rule in that area.  
Indirect rule implied the existence of two levels of government in northern 
Nigeria in the period of Lugard’s high commissionership. At the apex was the 
protectorate government headed by the high commissioner and comprising the 
residents, the other European political and technical staff and their African 
clerical and non-clerical supporting staff (Aloje 1996, p. 9).  
The authority of this government extended over the whole protectorate and covered 
every aspect of the internal administration of the territory. Subordinate to this was the 
native administration of each state headed by the state’s paramount chief and 
comprising his principle traditional counsellors, aides and staff of lower ranks  
The whole of northern Nigeria was divided into a number of provinces, each placed 
under the charge of a senior political officer, the Resident, who was expected to 
conduct the delicate political negotiations between each paramount chief in the 
province and the high commissioner. For more effective administration and 
supervision each province was further organised into divisions each of which was 
placed under the administrative charge of a District Officer assisted, in the case of the 
larger divisions, by one or more Assistant District Officers. As Ndoh (1997) put it: 
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The objective of the British administration in Nigeria in its approach towards 
the indigenous political institutions entailed the incorporation of these 
traditional institutions as part of the machinery of government. It is also to use 
them in training traditional rulers in the modern methods of government 
(p.11). 
In order to give practical and legal effect to this principle of governing each African 
state through its own political institutions, Lugard enacted the Native Authority 
Proclamation. Under this law, the high commissioner had the power to appoint native 
authorities who, subject to the resident’s control and supervision, were responsible 
for communicating the administrative orders and instructions of the protectorate 
government. 
In later years, as native authorities grew wealthier and better able to take on 
additional responsibilities, various statutes assigned to them more administrative 
duties. An example of this trend was the Native Revenue Proclamation, which 
empowered residents, with the approval of the High Commissioner, to levy an annual 
tax on communities in the region. It also made the native authorities tax collecting 
agents accountable to the high commissioner via the resident. Okhaide (1996) points 
out how indirect rule involved complex power relations that were often not 
understood by the British: 
The native authority Ordinance of 1916 formally introduced indirect rule to 
Western Nigeria. Though the Yoruba areas which constituted the Western part 
of Nigeria had a centralised traditional political system with authority flowing 
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from the Obas at the centre, to the chiefs and to the district and village heads, 
little did the colonial masters know that the powers of the Obas was subject to 
some checks by the chiefs and in particular the ‘Oyo Mesi’ (p.34). 
At the judicial level, Lugard devised a judicial system whose primary objective was 
to leave the administration of justice, as far as possible, to local courts following their 
own laws and procedures. In this way he hoped to secure continuity in the 
administration of justice using broadly the same judicial institution and personnel as 
each community had evolved for itself prior to colonial rule. He therefore introduced 
a policy which would preserve the traditional legal system and as many of its legal 
ideas and procedures as acceptable to British standards.  
The effect of the judicial system was to give the paramount chief more control of the 
people in his region. The Native Courts proclamation can be highlighted as perhaps 
the most important enactment in demonstrating to the Fulani ruling class the sincerity 
of the high commissioner in pledging not to interfere with religious freedom and 
restoring them to positions of authority in return for accepting British sovereignty.  
The system of indirect rule was very successful in the northern regions because of its 
already established traditional Islamic system of rule. 
In the northern region, the colonial government took careful account of Islam 
and avoided any appearance of a challenge to traditional values that might 
incite resistance to British rule. This system, in which the structure of 
authority focused on the emir to whom obedience was a mark of religious 
devotion, did not welcome change. As the emirs settled more and more into 
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their role as reliable agents of indirect rule, colonial authorities were content 
to maintain the status-quo, particularly in religious matters (All Refers 
Reference 2003, p. 2).  
On the other hand, the emirs who refused the authorities of the colonial master were 
deposed and exiled, while their powers became subject to the authority of the 
colonialists.  
If the emirs accepted British authority, abandoned the slave trade and co-
operated with British officials in modernizing their administrations, the 
colonial power was willing to confirm them in office. The emirs retained their 
caliphate titles but were responsible to British district officers, who had final 
authority. The British high commissions could dispose emirs and other 
officials if necessary. Lugard reduced sharply the number of titled fief holders 
in the emirates, weakening the rulers’ patronage … caliphate officials were 
transformed into salaried district heads and became, in effect, agents of the 
British authorities, responsible for peacekeeping and tax collection (Library of 
Congress 1991, p. 1). 
3.6.1 Indirect rule in the southwest 
The British, believing that the political and economic situation was the same as that 
in the North, introduced the same system of indirect rule in southern Nigeria. Unlike 
those in the north, however, the traditional rulers in the southwest did not have 
autonomous power like their counterparts in the North. They were subject to checks 
on their power by chiefs and other title-holders in their territories.  
40 
This posed a difficult situation for the colonial administrators. When the traditional 
ruler started making decisions unilaterally, acting on the directives of the British 
administrators, the local population began questioning the integrity of the Obas and 
their chiefs. The situation was exacerbated when a system of taxation was introduced 
in the Yoruba region, leading to a number riots. The situation has been described well 
by Okhaide (1996): 
Though the Yoruba area which constituted the western part of Nigeria had a 
centralised traditional political system with authority flowing from the Obas at 
the centre to the chiefs and to the district and village heads, little did the 
colonial administrators know that the powers of the Obas was subjected to 
some checks by the Chiefs…. [With] the introduction of indirect rule, the 
traditional rulers began to pass decisions independently acting on the 
instructions of the colonial administrators to their subjects who rejected such 
decisions or policy as a negation of the norms of the traditional Yoruba 
system … [T]he situation got worse when tax was introduced in Yoruba land, 
which led to the Iseyin riot of 1917 and the riot over collection of water rates 
in Lagos in the 1920s. Those Obas who opposed the influence of the British 
rule in their domain were dethroned while those that accepted the colonial 
administrative system were installed as kings (p. 34). 
The complete success of indirect rule in the North and its partial success in the West 
prompted the colonial masters to introduce it to eastern Nigeria. 
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3.6.2 Indirect rule in the southeast 
While indirect rule was successful in the north, it was far less so in the southeast. 
Here the British had to deal with societies that, unlike the Yoruba provinces and the 
Muslim emirates of the northern protectorate, did not have a centralised social and 
political structure, and a large territory that was more or less acephalous.  
The administrators in Nigeria’s south recognised that despite the lack of an 
indigenous power structure they could not administer alone and that some form of 
assistance was needed from the chiefs or other leaders of each community. The 
trouble, however, was that no such chiefs or natural rulers existed or, at least, were 
willing to come forward. 
To retrieve the situation the British had to identify, as best they could, the people who 
seemed to them to possess the qualities they deemed essential in anyone who could 
legitimate their governance. This resulted in the creation of a new class of chiefs 
hitherto unknown in southern society. They leaders were named warrant chiefs due to 
the warrant of appointment they received from the British administration. Okhaide 
(1996) explains the implications of the appointment of warrant chiefs: 
This practice was unprecedented in the annals of the history of the Igbo 
political administration. Such warrant chiefs appointed lacked legitimacy 
from the local people and their laws were not executed by the local populace. 
Matter went worse with the heavy handedness of the warrant chiefs in the 
handling of issue of direct taxation. This was strange in Igbo land. Hence the 
women revolted against the warrant chiefs and their obnoxious policy of 
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direct taxation. Thus the Aba women riot of 1929 attests to the failure of the 
indirect rule in Eastern Nigeria (Okhaide 1996, p. 36). 
The majority who received warrants did not have any traditional claim to the new 
administrative role the British imposed on them. In general, warrants went to those 
who had, in one way or another helped the advancing British patrol. There was also a 
misconception as to what the office of warrant chief involved, the general belief 
being that the new warrant chiefs were taken away to be sold as slaves or to be 
detained as servants. Given these misconceptions the local populations attempted to 
save their societies by hiding their real leaders and withholding their identities, and 
substituting them with individuals whose loss would not be altogether unwelcome to 
the society.  
Moreover, the method of establishment of British rule by force of arms undermined 
the faith of the local population and was largely responsible for the lack of co-
operation the administration experienced. Given this situation, the colonial office in 
Britain through its representatives in northern Nigeria decided to merge the northern 
and the southern protectorates.  
Indirect rule had little success in the south-west and was a total failure in the south-
east. One of the main reasons for its mixed fortunes in the south-west was that the 
traditional authority held by local rulers was based on democratic practices, in that 
the rulers were subject to some checks and could not act unilaterally without first 
consulting the councils of chiefs. The total failure of indirect rule in the south-east 
was due to the nature of the stateless communities in that region which had no prior 
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traditional rulers or centralised administrative systems. For this reason, the warrant 
chiefs appointed by the colonial master lacked popular legitimacy and could not 
assert control over the people. The main point of conflict that led to the breakdown of 
indirect rule was taxation, which many warrant chiefs were unable to collect, instead 
their efforts to assert their authority over tax collection sparked protests and riots in 
different parts of the country, including the Aba women’s riot in 1929 in the south-
east, the Ire conflicts in the south-west and the large general action in 1945. 
3.7 The Nigeria Amalgamation of 1914 
Administrative difficulties aside, amalgamation of the two protectorates was based on 
economic expediency. The northern protectorate was running at a severe deficit, 
which was being subsidised by southern protectorate and an imperial grant-in aid 
from Britain each year. This was at odds with the age-old colonial policy that each 
territory should be self-sufficient. Secondly, it was felt that since the two 
protectorates occupied a contiguous expanse of land without any intervening foreign 
power, they should be annexed.  
This was further supported by the argument that the northern protectorate could not 
justifiably be separated form the southern protectorate since the north was landlocked 
and depended on the south for sea transportation. Furthermore, there was the pressing 
need to co-ordinate railway policy, which at that time was practically non-existent. 
For all of these reasons the unification of the two protectorates was authorised by 
Lord Lugard in 1914. Aloje (1997) observes that: 
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The northern protectorate was running at a severe deficit, which was being 
met by a subsidy from the southern protectorate. Again, it was a cheaper 
means of administration for the British whose policy was that territories 
should be able to pay for the cost of administering the areas in question (p.14). 
The unification of the two protectorates, however, paid little regard to the differences 
in the socio-political, economic and religious ways of life of the people within them. 
This newly created country contained not only a multiplicity of pagan tribes, but also 
a number of great kingdoms and emirates that had evolved complex systems of 
government prior to contact with Europe. The annexation of these different ethnic 
nationalities and the inherently complex nature of that union and its manipulation by 
the British, impeded progress towards independence and helped create the problems 
encountered to date in trying to forge national integration and political stability. 
Each of these grouping had different social, cultural, political and economic 
life different from each other. The colonization of Nigeria brought about the 
unification of these diverse groupings into a single geo-political entity now 
known as the Nigerian state without due regard to the district and autonomous 
existence of these groupings… it has gone down as an important landmark in 
Nigeria’s political history and also formed seedbed on which to be planted the 
seeds of Nigerian federalism (Okhaide 1996, pp. 10, 25 & 113).  
3.7.1 Problems with the amalgamation 
The union of 1914 was so sudden and ill-managed that the colonial masters and the 
people of Nigeria wondered if the new federation could survive as a country due to its 
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historical setting. Oyovbaire (1985) explained the lack of historical precedent for the 
British effort to unify the territory: 
When the British had established and consolidated its structures of 
governance over the contemporary boundaries of the country from about 1900 
onwards, no ruler or set of rulers, social class or regime had any claims of 
power-state over all the pre-colonial state system (p. 29). 
The unification of the two protectorates was done in such a way that the merger 
effectively took place only on paper. As a matter of fact, although the two territories 
were said to be amalgamated, Lugard chose to maintain a distinction between north 
and south. The only reason he had for this was that he really did not want to break up 
the administration he had devised for the north. So even after amalgamation, the 
northern and southern provinces of Nigeria retained their status as British colonies, 
with their inhabitants having the rights of British citizens. As Okhaide has observed, 
Lugard centralised only where absolutely necessary, preferring regional control. This 
only exacerbated the growing differences between the two regions. 
In order to keep the northern centralised political system for purposes of 
taxation, western educational and cultural values, which had taken roots in the 
south as a result of missionary activities were prevented from reaching the 
north. So the two protectorates, though amalgamated, were administered 
differently. Lugard centralised only those departments that he felt necessary 
for control of overall policy. At every turn, he shied away from the acquisition 
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of a large administration, so that the administration was effectively 
regionalized under the Lieutenant Governors (Okhaide 1996, p. 113).  
Tax was introduced and this assisted the colonial authorities in building new 
infrastructure. Construction of roads and railways linking all the regions and building 
of hospital as well as other social amenities were in evidence in most cities in 
Nigeria. Economic interaction flourished between the regions in Nigeria, but indirect 
rule frustrated political co-operation among them. In fighting the Second World War, 
the British used revenue from the Nigeria treasury. Over time, more taxes were 
gradually introduced, and in total there were about fifteen types of tax administered in 
Nigeria during the colonial era. 
The introduction of tax boosted the financial base of the British make 
economic, education and development activities to flourish. Links among the 
regions increased only on trade and not political interchange. Public works, 
such as harbour dredging and road and railroad construction, opened Nigeria 
to economic development…Other commercial crops such as cocoa and rubber 
also were encouraged, and tin was mined on the Jos Plateau…and 
improvements in ports facilities and the transportation infrastructure during 
World War 1 furthered economic development (Library of Congress 1991, p. 
2). 
3.8 The emergence of the nationalist movement  
This phenomenon of maintaining different administrative systems within Nigeria 
even after amalgamation is referred to as amalgamation without unification. The 
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consequence of that policy and the growing awareness of nationalist movements in 
other parts of the world, coupled with the sense of frustration in continuing colonial 
rule, motivated Nigerians, especially the educational elites, to begin to demand 
indigenous participation in the governance of their country. 
Early reaction against foreign control in Nigeria took the form of pre-national anti-
colonial resistance, involving the early militant resistance put up against colonialism 
by traditional rulers such as King Jaja of Opobo, King Kosoko of Lagos and the 
Sultan of Sokoto. The major characteristics of this resistance were the adoption of a 
military strategy, with a notion of freedom that African traditional rulers should be 
left to rule their kingdoms in ways stipulated by their ancestors. However, this 
resistance did not succeed because of the inferior weapons used by African fighters. 
Abgedoka (1965) has observed: 
The nationalist movement in Nigeria in the early stages received 
encouragement from the traditional ruler protests against British 
encroachments. As we already seen, it was the traditional authorities like 
Kosoko of Lagos, Pepple of Bonny and Jaja of Opobo who organised these 
protests (p.138). 
The emergence of nationalist desires amongst the people of Nigeria stemmed from an 
awareness of nationalist movements elsewhere. Modern nationalism includes 
sentiments, activities and organisational developments aimed explicitly at self-
government and independence as a nation-state existing as an equal in the 
international system. The position of the colonial government in Nigeria and the 
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policies it perpetrated, coupled with the desire of Nigerian elites for self-
determination, laid the ground for the modern nationalist struggle. As a matter of fact 
although the years that followed Lugard’s governorship were among the quietest in 
Nigeria political history they marked the emergence of a new class of Africans who 
began to think of themselves as Nigerians rather than Igbo, Hausa or Yoruba. It was 
this group which, though initially confined almost exclusively to Lagos, wrested 
control of affairs from the British government and attained independence for Nigeria 
in 1960.  
At first modern Nigerian nationalism was promoted largely by non-Nigerians, and its 
focus was on Africa as a whole, rather than on the seemingly artificial units drawn up 
by the European colonial powers. Men like Edward Blyden from the West Indies, 
who sought the cultural emancipation of blacks, and J. P. Jackson, a Liberian, who 
edited the Lagos Weekly Record and constantly attacked the British administration, 
spearheaded nationalist activity until the 1920s. It should be remembered that British 
policy in Nigeria thus far had been to keep educated Africans out of local 
administration.  
Agbodeka (1965) argues that the rise of nationalism in Nigeria was shaped by both 
external and internal influences: 
[T]he work of the Pan-African Congress championed by Dr. Du Bois, the 
celebrated American Negro scholar, the activities of the communists, the work 
of the West African Students’ Union and the explosion of the idea of white 
superiority. The influence on Nigeria of the West African Students’ Union, 
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founded in the United Kingdom by a Nigerian, Lapido Solanke in 1925 was 
particularly great.… Ex-servicemen came back propagating new ideas about 
democracy which they had fought to save for the world (p. 139). 
The publication of the Atlantic Charter in 1945 prompted much public discussion 
centring on its famous third clause, which stipulated the right of all peoples to choose 
the form of government under which they will live. Herbert Macaulay, revered today 
by many as ‘the father of Nigerian nationalism’ was, however, already agitating 
against the government of Lagos even before Lugard became Governor-General. 
Although Macaulay’s activities were initially limited to Lagos, those early 
nationalists had a wider aim: to fight the exclusiveness and racial basis of the 
Crown’s system of government.  
At the beginning of the struggle, the issue was not so much self-government but a 
measure of participation in the existing government. To this end, the National 
Congress of British West Africa was founded in 1920 in order that people of African 
descent could participate in the government of their own country, an aim inspired in 
part not only by the writings of W. E. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey, but also by the 
declaration of the American President himself on the rights of all peoples to self-
determination. 
This led to the formation of different political parties by Nigerian politicians, such as 
the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) founded in 1922 by Herbert 
Macaulay, the Nigeria Youth Movement (NYM) in 1937, Action Group (AG) in 
1940, the National Council of Nigeria and the Camerouns (NCNC) in 1943, and the 
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Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in 1951. These political organisations could be 
said to be the beginning of organised nationalism in Nigeria. The priority of these 
parties was to demand for Nigerians equal participation in the political and economic 
opportunities enjoyed by the colonisers. It is important to note here that the 
nationalist movement in the northern region was more religious in outlook, geared 
towards Islamic doctrines which recognised the rule of the Emirs, so nationalist 
sentiments there were decidedly anti-Western. 
3.9 Party conflicts and their effects on federalism 
With ethnicity as a ready tool for elite mobilisation for access to power and resources, 
and regionalism as a framework for class formation and politics alongside the 
structural inequities embedded in the colonial state, the stage was already set for a 
troubled process of federalisation in Nigeria. By 1923, when political parties were 
formed and with the introduction of the Nigerian Legislative Council, party 
formations were drawn along regional lines. As pointed out by Babatope (2004): 
The period of 1951 to 1962 witnessed the consolidation of politics of ethnic 
chauvinism in the history of Nigeria. While the Action Group Political Party 
dominated political activities in the West, the NCNC was the major political 
power in the east and the Northern People Congress under the control of 
Ahmadu Bello was in control of the North (p.2). 
This led to the formation of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) in 1923. 
The failure of the NNDP to be an umbrella party led to the formation of the National 
Youth Movement (NYM) in 1938. In that year, the NYM ended the domination of the 
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NNDP in the Legislative Council and went ahead to establish a party that had 
affiliations with other political organisations. However, internal conflict caused by 
ethnic loyalties split the NYM. Members such as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (a journalist 
and newspaper proprietor) and other Igbo members of the NYM left the organisation 
in Yoruba hands. 
Conflict began over whom to replace Abayomi, a member of the Nigeria Youth 
Movement, who was to resign his seat from the Legislative Council. Yoruba 
indigenes within the party wanted one of their own to replace him, while the Igbos 
one of theirs was the best option. This controversy left the party divided and an 
entirely Yoruba affair. Matters came to a climax when Azikiwe, who wanted to enter 
the House of Representative, was defeated in his bid due to the constitutional 
requirements for membership of the House of Representatives.  
In 1943 the National Council of Nigeria and the Camerouns (NCNC) was formed. 
The NCNC later became the National Council of Nigerian Citizens which was 
initially by Herbert Macaulay, a veteran nationalist leader. On his death in 1947 he 
was succeeded by Azikiwe. In the meantime, different regional associations like the 
Egba Omo Oduduwa and the Jam’iyyar Mutanem Arewa (JMA) were formed in their 
various regions, later becoming the Action Group (AG) Party and Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC) respectively. Conflicts within these parties brought about the 
formation of other parties as well. The Northern Elements Progressive Union 
(NEPU), the United Nigeria Independence Party (UNIP), the Bornu Youth Movement 
(BYM) and the Kano People’s Party (KPP) were all formed out of NPC, while the 
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United People’s Party (UPP) and Midwest Democratic Front (MDF) also broke out of 
the AG party.  
The NCNC, NPC, and the AG were the main parties of the first republic. Other 
political parties were highly localised parties focused on specific issues and whose 
main significance was that they provided avenues for one or other of the three 
dominant to extend their electoral reach into regions outside their principle sphere of 
influence.  
This early history of conflict between political parties prior to independence 
highlights the importance of regional interests from the very beginning of Nigerian 
democratic politics. The conflict between the Yorubas and the Igbos, which started in 
the 1930s, has extended beyond Nigerian independence and the demise of the first 
republic until today.  
In 1952-53, a census was conducted which showed that about half of the population 
was residing in Nigeria’s north. However, because it was assumed that the census 
was for tax collection purposes, many people in Nigeria evaded being counted. The 
estimate of numbers in other regions was considered totally unacceptable as the 
figures were to be used in allocating seats in the House of Representatives and for the 
allocation of resources. This led to strong calls for another census.  
The northern region’s political strength, marshalled by the NPC, had arisen in 
large measure from the results of the 1952-53 census, which had identified 54 
percent of the country’s population in that area—politicians stressed the 
connection between the census and parliamentary representation on one hand, 
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and the amount of financial support for regional development on the other 
(All Refers Reference, 2003, p. 2). 
The motive behind the agitation for a new census was the desire to break up and 
weaken the northern region since it would now have more than half of the country’s 
members in the House of Representative. Knowing this, the northerners created a 
regional alliance with the west.  
Ethnic tension and fear of domination between the three dominant ethnic groups in 
Nigeria was blown out of proportion when in 1953 Anthony Enahoro, an AG member 
of the House of Representatives, moved a motion for self- government for Nigeria in 
1959. The northerners saw the motion as an attack on them and an attempt by 
southerners to dominate them should independence be granted. On grounds of 
unpreparedness the northerners rejected the motion. The result was that the British 
granted self-government to the southern protectorate in 1956 before granting 
independence to the whole country in 1960. The struggle for leadership positions and 
dominance within the political scene due to fear and mutual suspicion led to the 
adoption of a federal system of government upon independence in 1960. 
3.10 Constitutional development 
The pressure from these organised nationalist movements was the real beginning of 
Nigeria’s constitutional development that started with the Nigerian Council of 1914 
after the amalgamation of the northern and the southern protectorates. 
3.10.1  The Nigerian Council of 1914 
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This council was the first type of constitution put in place in Nigeria. It consisted of 
thirty-six members in all and comprised the governor, members of the executive 
council, first-class residents, political secretaries, and the secretaries of the southern 
and the Northern provinces. According to Aloje (1996) 
There were also thirteen non-official members nominated by the governor to 
represent the interests of commerce, shipping, mining and banking. Each 
nominee was to represent Lagos and Calabar chambers of commerce and one 
represented the chambers of mines. Six Nigerians were nominated by the 
governor to represent the native population of the coast and the interior. It was 
observed that this council was a purely advisory body as resolutions passed by 
it had no legislative or executive authority (p.25).  
The Nigerian Council failed to meet the aspirations of Nigerians, being limited to the 
discussion of the governor-general’s annual address and constitution was replaced. 
3.10.2 The Clifford’s Constitution 
When Sir Hugh Clifford became Governor in 1922 he replaced the 1914 constitution 
with another which sought to remedy inadequacies. Under the new arrangement, two 
councils were created: a Legislative and an Executive Council. The Legislative 
Council had an official non-Nigerian majority and of the non-official minority fifteen 
were nominated by the governor to represent banking, mining, shipping and 
commercial concerns.  
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The Clifford’s constitution collapsed partly due to the lack of Nigerian representation. 
Another important consideration is that the constitution did not bring the north into 
the Legislative Council. As Okhaide (1996) has observed, the inclusion of southern 
Nigeria fuelled the emergence of political activities in the south, while the exclusion 
of the north placed it ‘in a backward position as regard political education’ (p. 59). 
Furthermore, the Executive Council was a purely advisory body whose advice was 
not binding on the governor in the exercise of his executive powers. Fatally, it was 
made up of twelve officials none of whom was African.  
3.10.3  The Richard’s Constitution 
The Richard’s constitution was drafted based on the proposals devised by Sir Bernard 
Bourdillion (the colonial secretary) and came into effect in August 1946 creating a 
Legislative Council for the whole country. It was composed of a governor (president 
of the council), sixteen official members and twenty-four nominated or indirectly 
elected members. The constitution also formally created the northern, eastern and 
western regions. Of the members of the Legislative Council, the north was 
represented by two officials and nine non-officials, while the western and eastern 
provinces were represented by two officials each as well as six and five non-official 
members respectively. Under this constitution, the regions had Houses of Assembly 
with the north also having a House of Chiefs. Ndoh (1997) declared that: 
The three main objectives of Richard’s constitution were: to promote Nigerian 
unity; to stress a diversity of outlook by encouraging each of the regions to 
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develop along its characteristic lines; and to secure greater participation by 
Nigerians in the discussion of their own affairs (p.36). 
The implementation of these objectives gave the Richard’s constitution its unique 
characteristics: the inclusion of the north in Nigeria’s constitutional development; its 
concept of regionalism; the incorporation of the native authorities in to the 
constitutional structure; the domination of the legislative councils by a non-official 
majority (whether nominated or indirectly elected); and efforts to represent and cater 
for all interests and sections of the country. 
The Richard’s constitution was, however, bitterly criticised for a number of reasons: 
it was arbitrarily imposed on the country; its proposals were designed to create a false 
impression of providing for an unofficial majority when in actual fact the non-
officials were either chiefs appointed by the governor or those chiefs’ nominees; it 
created regional councils with no legislative autonomy even on matters which were of 
their immediate concern; and it did not in any way extend the elective principle 
introduced in the Clifford’s constitution.  
Again the native authority served as electoral colleges to the regional assemblies and 
the principles of election were not extended to the north as in the 1922 Legislative 
Council. Furthermore, Nigerians were not made heads of government departments 
and governors had veto powers that could be used arbitrarily. Moreover, the property 
or income qualification for voting in Lagos and Calabar excluded all the working 
class from voting. 
3.10.4 The Macpherson’s Constitution 
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Against the backdrop of criticism of the Richard’s constitution and following a series 
of constitutional conferences and an elaborate consultation that extended to the 
grassroots a new constitution was introduced. The Macpherson’s constitution 
established a bicameral legislature in the northern and western regions of the country 
with Houses of Chiefs and Assembly for the two regions and a House of Assembly 
for the eastern region. A House of Representatives was at the central level and made 
up of a governor or president appointed by the governor, six executive members, 136 
representatives and no more than six special members appointed by the governor. 
According to Aloje (1996), these members were selected through the electoral 
college, with an Executive Council established for each region and a Council of 
Ministers for the centre. Each regional Executive Council consisted of a lieutenants-
governor as president, three ex-official members, two official members appointed by 
the lieutenant-governor and nine regional ministers. The central Council of Ministers 
comprised the governor as president, six ex-official members, and twelve ministers, 
four from each region. Nigerians were now made ministers though without any 
ministerial responsibility. It was: 
A federal system of government with considerable powers given to the 
regions and a new legislative body came into being in the regions: a House of 
Assembly in each region, as well as House of Chiefs in the western and 
northern regions. These new bodies could make laws for their own regions but 
the Central Legislative Council which became the House of Representatives 
could still legislate for Nigeria as a whole. Regional Legislative Assemblies 
were mainly Africans (Nigerians) members and a minority of ex-officio 
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ministers in charge of Finance, Justice and Defence. The Lieutenant-
Governors, however, possessed reserved powers to veto the decisions of these 
assemblies should the need arise (Agbodeka 1965, p. 143).  
The Macpherson’s constitution could not work, however, for a number of reasons: it 
did not provide for a responsible government at the centre in that it created ministers 
who were only charged with responsibility for matters and not made heads of 
departments concerned with these matters; it did not provide for the position of the 
premier in the regions and prime minister at the centre; the continued power struggles 
between regional parties; and the Kano riots which followed. 
3.10.5 The Lyttleton’s Constitution 
The breakdown of the Macpherson’s constitution gave birth to yet another 
constitution in 1954, named after the then Secretary of State, Oliver Lyttleton. With a 
new fiscal arrangement and regionalisation of the public service, the constitution 
accepted the federal nature of Nigeria, recognising three regions, with the state 
government exercising residual powers. Elections were held to a House of 
Representatives and to The House of Regional Assemblies on a party basis. It also 
granted a quasi-federal status to southern Cameroon and a regionalisation of 
marketing boards.  
Again, the constitution provided for enlarged legislative assemblies with Nigerians in 
the majority elected Party leaders with an overwhelming majority in the Houses of 
Assemblies were appointed as either premiers or prime minister in the central 
government. Each region, with the exception of the north, now had a premier. 
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Speakers were appointed to the House of Representatives and in the eastern and 
western Houses of Assembly. Presidents were to lead the House of Chiefs in the 
northern House of Assembly. Lagos was to remain the capital, while Southern 
Cameroon now enjoyed a large measure of autonomy subject to the assent of the high 
commissioner. Aloje (1996) attested that: 
The constitution had a number of weaknesses: it created ministers whose 
loyalty tended towards their regions; it failed to provide a second chamber at 
the centre; and it did not provide for a prime minister at the centre. These 
defects led to its revision through the constitutional conferences in 1957 
(p.29). 
3.10.6 The 1957 Constitutional Conference 
The 1957 Constitutional Conference was held in London under the leadership of the 
Colonial Secretary Alex Lennox-Boyd. Under the Constitutional Conference, the 
western and eastern regions were granted self-government in 1957, while the northern 
region was to have self-government in 1959. The conference provided the eastern 
region with a bi-cameral legislature with the establishment of a House of Chiefs for 
the region.  
According to Okhaide (1996) report, the central legislature was to be bicameral in 
nature with the establishment of a Senate. The Senate was to have twelve members 
from each region and southern Cameroon, four from the Federal Territory of Lagos 
and an additional four members. The House of Representatives was to be enlarged, 
including an office of prime minister to be created and the governor-general 
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empowered to appoint any person to the position he felt commanded majority support 
in the House. Universal adult suffrage was to serve as the yardstick for election of 
members into the regional legislatures although only adult male suffrage was allowed 
in the northern region. 1 October 1960 was chosen as the date for Nigeria’s 
independence.  
3.10.7 The 1958 Constitutional Conference 
The 1958 Constitutional conference dealt with two vital issues. The first was the fear 
expressed by the minority groups that independence would mean their domination by 
majority ethnic groups. They therefore agitated for the creation of separate states for 
their areas. To allay their fears, a commission was set up under Henry Willinck to 
investigate whether the creation of more regions would solve this problem. At this 
point, the north and southern Cameroon were to be administered as trusteeship 
territories under the United Nations and were no longer parts of Nigeria. 
3:11 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the ways in which Nigeria was legally bound together by 
the colonial authority and how it has operated different administrative systems in 
each of the regions. It also explained that nationalist movements in the northern 
regions were more religious in outlook, focused towards Islamic doctrines that 
recognised Sultan rule. The chapter also highlighted the British authority’s interests 
as being chiefly in the economy and that the few Nigerians who were made official 
and non-official members had little or no authority.  
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The constitution did not bring the north into the legislative council until after 1946, 
while the powers of the traditional rulers were drastically reduced in being given 
instructions and regulations by the colonial representatives. It is argued that in all 
constitutions, the governor-general, representing British interests, possessed too much 
power and, at a later stage, that ministers appointed by the governor-general had 
strong loyalty towards their regions. On the whole, the centralisation of powers 
during this period shows that decentralisation was absent in Nigeria’s formation.   
The Nigerian political federation was formed on the basis of amalgamating various 
tribes whose differences were not sufficiently considered. The attempted merger of 
these pre-colonial units paid little regard to the differences in the social, political, 
economic and religious ways of life of the people within them. Oyovbaire (1985) 
observed that, ‘[p]rior to this century, the contemporary Nigerian formation was 
composed of state-systems or communities described variously as empires, a 
caliphate, kingdoms, chiefdoms, city-states, and village republics’ (p. 29). The 
colonisation of Nigeria brought about the unification of these diverse groupings into a 
single geo-political entity now known as Nigeria state without due regard to the 
distinct, complex and autonomous existence of these groupings (Okhaide, 1996).  
The struggle to cope with the burden of administrative governance by the British 
colonial authorities led to the introduction of indirect rule. It is argued, however, the 
British merely put in place an administrative system to facilitate their economic 
activities. The British, as the central authority, held overwhelming power over it 
regional representatives. Over time, this resulted in reducing the powers of the 
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traditional rulers as the system was operated in different ways in every region. 
Political instability ensued before and after independence, and constitutional 
development and other forms of decentralisation that followed were not sufficient to 
solve the initial administrative deficiencies on which the nation was built.  
The various constitutions drafted to accommodate the working of a centralised 
administrative system were all inadequate as the nation suffered political and 
administrative instability, and civil unrest as its policies were built around weak 
institutions. It is in response to this that the thesis argues for a decentralised system of 
administration incorporating traditional.  
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Chapter Four – The Political History of Nigerian Federalism (1960 – 
1999) 
This chapter deals with the period after independence, focusing on how political 
parties and their leaders in the first civilian administrations were bound or strongly 
related to their regions, and how successive military regimes further centralised 
power throughout their rule. It describes the circumstances that brought about 
military takeover of the administrative governance and how its long stay in 
governance further centralised the administrative system of governance in Nigeria 
until it relinquished power to a civilian government in 1999. The concluding part of 
this chapter explains the factors that brought about the centralisation which has 
supported corrupt practices. 
4.1.1 The 1960 Independence Constitution 
In 1960, a constitutional conference was held in London to put finishing touches to 
the independence constitution. As a result of this conference, provisions were made 
for an office of the prime minister in the constitution, while ex-officio members were 
removed from the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives. 
Fundamental human rights were entrenched in Nigeria’s constitution. The federal 
structure of Nigeria was retained with Lagos as the federal capital. Judges of High 
Courts and Supreme Courts were to be appointed on the advice of a Judicial Service 
Commission. The independence constitution also made provision for Nigerian 
citizenship. 
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4.1.2 The 1963 Republican Constitution 
At the 1963 constitutional convention held in Lagos, political leaders agreed that 
Nigeria should become a republic within the Commonwealth and a constitution was 
passed into law by the federal parliament. Under the constitution, an elected president 
took over the duties of the governor-general who represented the Queen of England 
as head of state of Nigeria. The president was also to act as the commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces. The Judicial Service Commission was abolished and instead the 
president was empowered to appoint judges to the Supreme Court and the High Court 
on the advice of the prime minister. The Supreme Court of Nigeria became the 
highest court of appeal in Nigeria, while the premier was to act as head of executive 
government at the regional level. Emergency power was conferred on the federal 
government to declare a state of emergency throughout Nigeria or any part thereof. 
The process of creating a new region and the alteration of the existing regional 
boundaries were entrenched in the constitution. The constitution further gave residual 
powers to the regional government and entrenched a revenue allocation formula 
based on need, national interest and balanced development. An amendment procedure 
to the constitution was also entrenched, requiring a two-thirds majority of all 
members of each house of the federal parliament and the concurrence by simple 
majority of each house of the legislature of at least three regions. 
The 1960 independence and 1963 republican constitutions of Nigeria 
epitomized some elements of a true federal system. The 1950 National 
conference had been followed by other consultations in 1953, 1954, 1957, and 
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1959, in which the practice of federalism was perfected (World Bank 2003, p. 
25). 
An important feature of these constitutions was the extensive powers granted to the 
regions making them effectively autonomous entities, along with an effective revenue 
arrangement, which ensured that the regions had the resources to carry out the 
immense responsibilities of governance.  
4.2 The first republic 
Disunity among Nigeria’s political leaders became obvious after Nigeria was granted 
self-rule, as political intrigue and inter-ethnic feuding took hold. In 1964/65, a general 
election was conducted to usher in the first civilian government under the 
parliamentary system of administration. However, the election was postponed for 
several weeks due to falsification of voter lists and census figures. This resulted in 
some parties boycotting the election, mostly in the eastern part of the country. When 
the election was finally conducted it produced a NPC-NCNC coalition. Alhaji Tafawa 
Balewa of the NPC became the first prime minister of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, while Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe of the NCNC became president. The AG, headed 
by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, became the opposition party. However, as Okhaide 
(1996) noted:  
Soon after independence, that unity among the nationalists which was 
essentially instrumental for Nigeria’s independence started to crack. With no 
more colonial masters to fight, they resorted to fighting one another using 
ethnicity, essentially as a battle-cry. Each of these nationalists was forced to 
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look up to his region or ethnic group for support and soon, ethnic politics 
gained ground with all its devastating effects. The parties which they formed 
were ethnically oriented and they were co-terminous with the major ethnic 
groups in Nigeria. For example, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) was 
for the northerners, the Action Group (AG) was for the west and the National 
Council for Nigeria Citizens (NCNC) was for the east. Each of these parties 
held on jealously to their regions and resisted very vehemently, any attempt 
by any other party to have inroads into their regions. Each of the parties 
adopted the strategy of encouraging rebellion in other regions and soon, 
splinter groups started to form their parties in these regions (p. 133). 
Claims that the 1965 election was rigged led to civil unrest in most parts of the 
country, especially in the west where fierce fighting erupted and many houses of 
political opponents were burned down. Despite the widespread charges of voting 
irregularities, the United People’s Party (UPP) headed by Akintola (a former member 
of the AG) with support from NPC in the north won convincingly in the elections. 
Akintola became the prime minister and took over the government of the western 
region.  
This resulted in a quarrel between Awolowo and Akintola. The situation later 
degenerated into a bloody riot in the western region, which brought effective 
government to an end as rival legislators brought violence to the floor of the regional 
legislature. Eventually, the federal government declared a state of emergency and AG 
was removed from power in the western region. The federal government dissolved 
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the legislature and named a federal administrator for the western region, while many 
AG members were placed under house arrest. Awolowo was later indicted and 
allegations of misappropriation of government fund and conspiracy to overthrow the 
government were levelled against him and some other leaders of the party. He was 
jailed along with other prominent politicians. 
During this period, Nigeria embarked on its first development plan. The northerners 
with their political party, the NPC, in power were able to use the development plan to 
the advantage of their region. Many of the federal government’s viable projects, 
military instillations and establishments were taken to the north, while northerners 
were recruited and trained to replace the more qualified southerners in civil service 
and government establishments. 
The NPC sought to redress northern economic and bureaucratic disadvantage 
… many of the federal government’s projects and military establishments 
were allocated to the north. There was an “affirmative action” program by the 
government to recruit and train northerners, resulting in the appointment of 
less qualified northerners to federal public service positions, many replacing 
qualified southerners. Actions such as these served to estrange the NCNC 
from its coalition partner. The reaction to the fear of northern dominance, and 
especially the steps taken by the NCNC to counter the political dominance of 
the north, accelerated the collapse of the young republic (Library of Congress 
1991, p. 2). 
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It should be noted here that the administrative system of governance in Nigeria in the 
first republic was regionally based, with every region having its own constitution, 
controlling its resources and paying fifty percent to the federal government. In the 
subsequent chapter, the issue of regional government will be discussed further as it 
forms the basis of the argument for decentralisation. 
4.3 The first coup, counter-coup and civil war 
Amidst the confusion, five army officers led by Major Patrick Chukuma Kaduna 
Nzeogwu (an officer from the eastern region) staged a coup that changed Nigeria’s 
political history. It resulted in the killings of Balewa in Lagos, Akintola in Ibadan, 
and Ahmadu Bello (the premier of the northern region), along with some top-ranked 
army officers from the north. In his broadcast to tell Nigerians their reasons for 
staging the coup, Nzeogwu stated that he would establish a strong, united and 
prosperous nation, free of corruption and internal strife. Nzeogwu failed to take over 
state power and, instead, the commander-in-chief Major General Johnson Aguiyi 
Ironsi, an Igbo, became the first military head-of-state. Ironsi promulgated Decree 
Numbers 33 and 34 in May 1966, which abrogated the federal system of government 
and substituted a unitary system (World Bank, 2003).  
This supplanting of the previous party-based federal political system by the military 
regime was, at least in theory, an imposition of a command relationship upon the 
politics of a federation (Oyovbiare 1985, p. 91). Because of the general inclination of 
Nigerians for a federal system of government, the abolition was resisted and 
repulsion for Ironsi’s unification of the country by military fiat led to a violent and 
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bloody riot in the north. The north, realising that the political power which had been 
their safeguard against the economic strength of the south had been suddenly taken 
from them, reacted and produced a counter-coup in July 1966 led by northern soldiers 
in which Ironsi and most top-ranking Igbo officers lost their lives. After a week of 
military manoeuvring, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon from the middle-belt took 
over as head-of-state. He returned the country to its federal structure and appointed 
military governors to each region. As is characteristic of military rule Nigeria became 
a unitary state in name only.  
The control of oil and oil revenue became centralised, while the subordinate units 
became mere representatives that depended fully on the federal government for 
directives and resources. The military governor of the eastern region Lieutenant 
Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, who claimed that he was the most senior military 
officer and thus should be appointed head-of-state, was being pressurised by other 
Igbo military officers to negotiate for more regional autonomy from the federal 
government. When they couldn’t reach an agreement on this issue, fight broke out 
between the Igbos and Hausas in the northern and eastern regions. The military high 
command then called a meeting with the governors in Lagos to resolve the problem 
but, for fear of his life, Ojukwu refused to attend the meeting in Lagos.  
Military leaders and senior officers of the police met in Ghana to reach an accord on a 
loose federation, but the northerners refused and the easterners threatened succession. 
Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra after the eastern Region Consultative 
Assembly voted to secede from Nigeria on May 30 1967 and a civil war ensued. 
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Major cities in the eastern region were captured in fierce battle and many casualties 
were recorded on both sides.  
The federal troops with the assistance of the Soviet Union and British fighters 
attacked Biafra on all fronts. As the fighting became tougher the Biafrans resorted to 
the use of propaganda, which won them international sympathy with a number of 
European countries, such as France and Sweden, who assisted them on occasions. In 
1969, Ojukwu appealed to the United Nations to mediate and called for a ceasefire as 
a starting point for peace negotiations. Ojukwu later fled and his chief of staff, Phillip 
Effiong, called for an immediate, unconditional cease-fire. The civil war lasted thirty 
months and ended in January 1970.  
The eastern region was co-opted into the federal fold and all significant political 
power remained concentrated in the federal military government. Gowon, on 
resuming office after the civil war, embarked on a process of rehabilitation and 
construction, which fortunately coincided with an international oil price rise. He drew 
up a transition program that would usher in a democratic civilian government in 
1976. He then created twelve states out of the Nigeria’s regions of Nigeria. ‘[T]he oil 
price boom, which began as a result of the high price of crude oil (the country’s major 
revenue earner) in the world market in 1973, increased the federal government ability 
to undertake these tasks (Library of Congress 1991, p. 2). 
The Gowon administration drew up a nine-point program which included the creation 
of states, the introduction of a national economic development plan, the drafting of a 
new constitution, the reconstruction of war-damaged areas and a new revenue 
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allocation formula. However, the regime fell short of achieving these goals due to 
widespread corruption and inefficiency at every level of its government. 
Embezzlement, bribing and nepotism were obvious, while crime, including armed 
robbery, extortion and killing, were at their highest levels during this period. The 
situation came to a climax when Gowon, without consultation, shifted the 1976 
handover date set for a return to civilian government. As a result, he was overthrown 
in a palace coup in July, 1975. 
4.4 The Murtala and Obasanjo regimes, 1975- 79 
On assuming political leadership, Murtala Muhammed set his administrative 
machinery in motion by embarking on cleansing exercise of the armed forces and the 
public service to rid them of corrupt officers. Through the exercise about 10,000 civil 
servants were dismissed. Three panels were set up to probe and punish corrupt 
officers and civilians found guilty of corrupt enrichment whose assets were 
confiscated.  
Murtala cancelled the planned 1973 Census and set up a constitutional drafting 
committee made up academicians and prominent civilian political leaders to submit a 
draft constitution to a constituent assembly for approval. He drew up a timetable for a 
return to civilian in October 1979 (Library of Congress 1991). Before this could 
happen, however, Murtala Muhammed was assassinated in a coup attempt in 
February 1979. His deputy Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba, took 
over as head-of-state and followed the agenda left by his predecessor until he handed 
over power to a civilian government in late 1979. 
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4.5 The second republic, 1979-83 
President Shehu Shagari led the incoming civilian government for the National Party 
of Nigeria (NPN), after a controversial election in 1979. The civilian government 
turned out to be weak because the coalition at the centre was not strong. Although the 
NPN was the dominant ruling party, the opposition controlled twelve states and there 
was little co-operation between these parties. Corruption was again very pronounced 
within the civilian administration. Dubious federal government contracts of little 
evident economic or developmental benefit were indiscriminately awarded. 
At the domestic level, the NPN-controlled federal government embarked on 
politically expedient but uneconomic projects, such as establishing a federal 
university in every state, commissioning iron and steel plants that remained 
unfinished in 1990, and indiscriminately awarding contracts to build the new 
federal capital at Abuja (Library of Congress 1991, p. 1).  
Many government officials raided the government treasury sending their gains to 
foreign countries, while in 1981 teachers staged a strike because they had not been 
paid. There were also religious riots in the north, which resulted in the deaths of 
thousands of people. It was not surprising, therefore, that in December 1983 the 
military responded by staging a coup. 
4.6 Return to military rule, 1983-1999 
General Muhammedu Buhari, a Hausa-Fulani northerner from Katsina state and a 
former member of the Supreme Military Council of the Muhammed/Obasanjo 
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regime, led the new military government. The structure of the new regime was the 
same as those of Gowon and Muhammed/Obasanjo. Their immediate task was to 
resuscitate the economy, which was failing as a result of corruption and 
misappropriation of funds by previous governments.  
The Buhari regime arrested and imprisoned corrupt government officials found guilty 
of embezzlement and mismanagement of government funds, and most of them had 
their properties confiscated. A ‘war’ was declared against indiscipline and efficiency 
was brought into the civil service and government system. However, popular 
discontent, a result of perceived government inflexibility, was used as a ploy by 
another top military officer General Ibrahim Babangida who staged a palace coup on 
27 August 1985 which brought the regime of Buhari to an end. 
Babangida, a middle-belt Muslim from Gwari in Niger state, stressed the need for 
urgent economic recovery and declared a national economic emergency. Under the 
economic emergency, the government introduced the Structural Adjustment Program, 
which was very harsh on the people but was believed to be the only alternative at that 
time. His agenda further strengthened his plan to handover to a civilian government 
in 1990, set up a constitutional drafting committee, formed and sponsored two 
political parties—the National Republican Party and the Social Democratic Party— 
and asked politicians to join whichever party suited them.  
Babangida kept on shifting elections and the handover date, while some of his 
policies and actions led to tensions, especially when in 1986 Nigeria became a 
member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Then in April 1990, 
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there was a coup attempt that threatened to split the country. On surviving the coup, 
Babaginda renewed his transition programe and in June 1993 presidential elections 
were finally held.  
Chief Moshood Abiola, a prominent Yoruba businessman from the south, contested 
for the Social Democratic Party, while Alhaiji Bashir Othman Tofa, an economist and 
businessman from the north, contested for the National Republican Convention. 
Voter turnout was reportedly low but the elections were thought to be free and fair.  
When it became apparent that Abiola would be the victor, Babangida declared the 
elections null and void. Abiola declared himself president, but later fled the country 
in the wake of death threats against him. Violent protests and strikes followed over 
the next two years in an attempt to return Abiola to power. He eventually returned to 
the country but was subsequently arrested on charges of sedition. Nigeria then 
plunged into its worst crisis since the Biafran war of the 1960s. After much pressure, 
Babangida resigned in August 1993. The government was taken over by an interim 
council but the real power was in the hands of General Sanni Abacha, then Secretary 
of Defence.  
The important thing to note is that all military governments had the same features. 
Okhaide (1996) summed it up this way: 
Since Gowon’s regime, through to Murtala/Obasanjo, Buhari/Idiagbon to 
Babangida, it has been a betrayal of hope. Tales of intimidation, oppression, 
high-handedness, corruption, insensitivity and official deceit have been the 
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order of the day. The difference between these regimes is of degree rather 
than of kind (p. 152). 
Abacha, a northerner from Kano state, again citing necessity, dismantled all political 
structures and set up his own, then laid out another transition program and handover 
date. He led a particularly oppressive regime under which thousands were jailed and 
countless numbers killed before he suddenly collapsed and died in 1998. After twelve 
hours of deliberation within the military’s top ranks, General Abdusalemi Abubakar, 
was appointed as the new military head-of-state.  
Within six months of taking over, Abubakar released a number of political prisoners 
and drew up a transition program to usher in a civilian government. A new 
constitution was hurriedly drawn up and put before a constituent assembly. However, 
as Shonibare (2004) opined, ‘[o]nce a draft constitution is forwarded to a constituent 
assembly which is composed of military apologists, it is already manipulated (p. 1). 
Nevertheless, elections were held as schedule and by May 1999 a civilian government 
was in power. 
4.7 Centralisation and its effects on Nigerian federalism 
Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, it has experienced thirty years of military 
rule. All through this period military leaders implemented the hierarchical command 
and authority structure of a military organisation, which is a great deviation from the 
usual principles and practices of federalism.  
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Except for the brief period following General Ironsi’s Decree No. 33 and 34 
of 1966, when Nigeria was officially declared a unitary state, successive 
military regimes exhibited pretensions in operating the federal system of 
government. Thus each military regime called itself “the federal military 
government.” Its administration was hierarchical in structure (not federal 
pyramidal). The Military Head of State and Commander-In-Chief appointed 
and removed the Military Governors/Administrators of the states. These 
appointees were answerable to their boss, not to the people. As events showed 
later in Nigeria’s history, these governors (depending on the personality of the 
head of state) were quite autonomous in their administration of the states 
(Elaigwu 2002, p. 75). 
Since the first military coup in 1966 all governments, whether military or civilian, 
have functioned under a centralised system of administration. In military regimes the 
most senior military officer assumed the position of the head-of-state and appointed 
other military officers as members of his cabinet. Moreover, in Gowon’s regime, the 
Supreme Military Council was the legislative body that made laws and also acted as 
the executive body, promulgating decrees that could not be challenged by any law 
court. The head-of-state appointed ministers, state governors, and commissioners 
while removing them at will.  
This period also saw increasingly centralised control over the economy and some of 
the responsibilities of the states, such as education and the media.  
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Although General Gowon had abandoned unitarism, the hierarchical unitary 
structure of the military remained unchanged, and contributed to the 
strengthening of the federal government at the expense of the state 
governments (Ademolekun and Ayo 1989, p. 161).  
Shell and British Petroleum Oil discovered oil in large quantities in Nigeria in 1956 
and it has become the main source of Nigeria’s revenue as the seventh largest oil 
producing state. With this enormous wealth, particularly since 1974, the federal 
government has resorted to changing the revenue allocation formula in its favour and 
has increased expenditure that has been of little development benefit to the states and 
the people, while making the states beg for funds in order to survive.  
Little wonder then that since focus has shifted from majority to minority 
beneficiaries under the derivation principle, it has become the federal 
government policy to reduce the emphasis placed on the principle. And 
mainly for the same reason, Nigeria has been criminally turned into a Unitary 
State, where all the State powers and resources are concentrated at the centre. 
A situation that has made the subsidiary governments to go cap-in-hand to the 
Federal government, as Father Christmas, begging for fund in order to make it 
through the day (Eraikhumen 2004). 
The arrangement did not change significantly during the brief civilian administration 
of 1979 to 1983 and the second military period of 1983 to 1999. In order to find an 
avenue for expanding the increased resources at its disposal as a result of this 
centralisation of revenue, the federal government began to extend it activities to areas 
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of expenditure once reserved for the states, first by the process of encroachment and 
later by formal legislation-backed take overs. The federal government became 
directly involved in primary and basic education, agriculture, banking, commerce and 
industry. Some of these involvements were later formalised in the 1979 and 1999 
constitutions. 
Eraikhuemen (2004) has shown that, the percentage of resources accruing to the 
federating units [provinces and states] based on the principle of derivation has been 
reduced by successive governments’ (p. 2).These changes in the allocation of 
resources and the principles of derivation, eventually gave the federal government 
over ninety percent of revenues, and these are still very much in effect.  
A recent World Bank report concluded that: 
The process of centralisation was completed with the introduction in the 1980 
of the Federation Account (FA) to hold all federally collected revenue, 
including the 20 percent onshore mining rents and royalties hitherto conceded 
on the basis of derivation, and inclusion of local government in the federal 
account revenue sharing arrangements (2002, p. 3). 
Civil unrest also had a great impact on the federalisation of the country by the 
military, as the emergency powers acquired by the federal government in order to 
deal with uprisings were not subsequently returned to the concurrent list of powers 
shared by the central government and the states. The federal government 
implemented: 
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….emergency powers to intervene in any region where law and order had 
broken down, as it did in the Western region in 1962. Relative to the power of 
states in 1990, however, the regions were very powerful; they had separate 
constitutions, foreign missions, and independent revenue bases. All this 
changed under military rule (Library of Congress Studies 1991, p. 2). 
The creation of states has also contributed immensely to the centralisation of Nigeria. 
Since 1960 each military regime has added to the numbers of states, allowing the 
central government to adopt a divide and rule approach to its dealings with the states, 
with the intention to weaken them and reduce their revenue.  
The creation of additional states from the four regions that existed by 1966 
meant weaker states, with narrower resources base. General Gowon created 
12 states in 1967. These were increased to 19 states by Murtala Mohammed in 
1976. General Babangida created two additional states in 1987, thus making 
21 states. He increased the number of states to 30 in 1991, while General 
Sanni Abacha increased the number of states to 36 in 1996. Paradoxically, as 
additional states were created to meet the demands of subnational groups for 
greater autonomy, the greater the number of states, the stronger the federal 
centre, and the more imperative its role, as a centre for taking necessary 
homogenizing or harmonizing actions in matters that transcend each state 
(Elaigwu 2002, p. 76). 
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Historical patterns have continued despite the type of government. An often-cited 
reason for this is that it is effectively the same set of people in leadership positions 
rotating power between themselves.  
The feudal oligarchy has always wielded power, whether as civilians or 
military dictators since it has both military and civilian wings. Whenever the 
civilian wing is in trouble, the military wing takes over. The rest of us have 
always remained in the wilderness, marginalised (Iyoha, Chizea & Akpotor 
1995, p. 249). 
Moreover, as Elaigwu (2002) point out: 
Except for the first republic, the constitutions of all the civilian regimes were 
drafted and handed over to the incoming civilian government after being 
manipulated by the various military governments through constituent 
assembly (p. 75). 
During this period, the role of the traditional institutions was further reduced, to the 
point where they had no formal executive, legislative or judicial responsibilities. 
Instead, they were tacitly accorded constitutional and legal recognition in the political 
system, and were placed on the government payroll.  
In the second republic, a Council of Chiefs was established in each state and granted 
power to advise the governor on any matter relating to customary law, cultural affairs 
or chieftaincy matters. At the federal level, traditional rulers were made members of 
the Council of State, with representatives from each state to advise the president only 
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on matters relating to population census, prerogative of mercy and the awarding of 
national honours.  
Governments interfered in the selection of traditional rulers and the politicisation of 
the traditional institutions helped to erode their dignity, status and power in society. 
Moreover, the Land Use Act of 1978, which vested the allocation and use of land in 
the hand of state governors further curtailed the powers of the traditional rulers in 
land matters (see Ajayi 1992 pp. 134-5). From 1979, Nigeria witness unending rows, 
confrontation and bitterness between many state governors and traditional rulers. 
Governors dismissed many traditional rulers without due regard for people’s wishes, 
while candidates favoured by these governors were installed as de facto kings and 
chiefs (Nwankwo 1988, p.227).  
All through this period of military rule, the role of the traditional institutions was 
undermined and their potential roles were not given any serious consideration. Under 
the regimes of General Buhari, Babangida and Abacha, their role was restricted 
largely to traditional and ceremonial functions. The situation was so grave that in 
many instances the governors went as far usurping the right of the affected people to 
choose their own traditional rulers.  
4.8 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has shown how, after a brief period of decentralisation during it first 
years of independence, the administrative system of Nigeria has become ever more 
centralised, particularly during the long stay of military regimes characterised by a 
unitary system of administration. The impact of civil war further strengthened the 
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justification of military holding onto power which created more centralised 
administrative system of governance. The chapter further stressed that during this 
period of military rule, the government merely broke down the administrative 
processes by creating States and later Local government Councils. Ethnic and cultural 
diversity as well as a measure of fairness in the distribution of resources have 
suffered as a result, leading to conflict and considerable suffering for the vast 
majority of Nigerians. The appointed governors and local government chairmen were 
answerable to the federal government and vested with superior powers over 
traditional rulers.  
Over this period, the military and the elected civilian government became involved in 
nomination and appointments of persons to the throne of a traditional ruler. This was 
done most times against the people choice. The traditional institutions were stripped 
of their autonomy and brought under the states and local government respectively to a 
purely advisory capacity. Therefore the authority and legitimacy of the traditional 
ruler was eroded enormously.  After deviating from the attributes and practices of real 
federalism during the more than thirty years of military rule, by May 1999 when the 
military handed over power to a civilian government, the Nigerian state had become 
excessively centralised. It is not surprising that various groups are calling for a 
Sovereign National Conference of all ethnic groups to discuss the restructuring of the 
Nigeria administrative system. The next chapter examines the effects of over-
centralisation in Nigeria. 
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Chapter Five – The Consequences of Over-Centralisation 
This chapter argues that excessive political centralisation in Nigeria has increased the 
level of government corruption. It will argue that over-centralisation of the Nigerian 
state is responsible for the power struggle by Nigerian politicians to occupy positions 
at the central, state and local government levels.  
Corruption has eaten deep into every sphere of human activity in Nigeria today, to the 
extent that Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 ranks 
Nigeria as the world’s sixth most corrupt nation (Transparency International 2005). 
Statistics shows that 85% of Nigeria wealth is gotten from oil and since control of oil 
and oil revenue has become centralised states and local government units have 
become mere outposts, relying on the central government for directives and funding 
(Almasih 2005).  
The spoils of office available at all levels of government have led to elections that 
have involved massive rigging, assassination of political opponents, stuffing of ballot 
boxes, bribing of police and intimidation of electoral officers. While politicians and 
officials exploit the opportunities for enrichment provided by their positions, high 
rates of unemployment and youth restlessness now afflict the nation despite massive 
natural resource revenues. This situation has given rise to the emergence of renewed 
agitation for resource control and fiscal federalism as a means of achieving stability 
and progress. 
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This chapter also examines the deceptive nature of government officials and political 
leaders in diverting government funds to private accounts, and the deceptive setting 
up of commissions to cover up their corrupt practices. The chapter also considers the 
large sums of money in Nigerian politics and why it is that only ex-senior military 
officers can afford to contest federal elections. Further, it examines the state of 
insecurity, human right abuses, self-imposition and ethnic politics. It shows how 
religion has infiltrated Nigeria’s political, economic and social life, and how it has 
been used to undermine the pursuit of genuine federalism in the country. Lastly, the 
chapter discusses the role of successive governments in fostering youth restlessness 
in many parts of the country. 
5.1 Corruption and centralisation 
Given the extent of cultural heterogeneity in Nigeria, along with the associated 
primordial paradigms, regionalism and religions, many Nigerians do not see 
themselves as belonging to the same country. Rather they hold allegiance to their own 
constituencies. This lack of national identification may explain the ease with which 
public officials have been willing to plunder the national treasury to enrich 
themselves and their followers. It also helps explain why the likes of Babagida, 
Abacha, Governor Joshua Dariye, and Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, amongst 
others, remain popular heroes in the consciousness of their ethnic region and kin. 
Retired General Ibrahim Babangida was regarded as a hero among his followers 
because many of his kinsmen got rich over night during his tenure in office (Ihenacho 
2004, p.4). Prior to 1985 when he became a military head of state, it was widely 
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believed that Babangida and his co-conspirators were the architects of many coups in 
Nigeria. After he was forced out of office in 1995, he handpicked Chief Ernest 
Shonekan to head an interim government for eventual take over by his friend General 
Sani Abacha. When Abacha died in 1998, Babangida masterminded the choice of 
General Abdusalam Abubakar as head of state and later co-sponsored President 
Olushegun Obasanjo and other political office holders.  It is believed that Babangida 
is nursing the ambition be become a civilian president in 2007 (Obumselu & 
Adekunle 2004).  
In Nigeria corruption within government circles has grown alarmingly over the past 
two decades, but it has a long history. During colonial rule and the period of the first 
republic corruption ran rampant, first at the federal and then at the regional and local 
levels. It was most serious at the federal level and then in the cocoa-rich western 
region, where investigators found that the activities of a small clique of ruling–party 
politicians and businessmen had drained the region’s marketing board of more than 
₦10 million essentially bankrupting it. Throughout that period government contracts, 
purchases, and loan programs were systematically manipulated to enrich political 
officials and the politically well connected. 
Corruption reached unprecedented levels during military rule from 1966 to 1979 and 
then from 1983 to 1999. It was this period that revealed the magnitude of the oil 
revenues. As the chairman of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission, Nuhu 
Ribadu, told the United Nations: 
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Nigeria earned a whopping ₦54,000 billion (US$400 billion) in the last 40 
years but there is little or nothing to show for it due to corrupt practices of 
past military leaders in the country, (Ige 2005 p. 1; Blair 2005). 
The brief stay of civilian government from 1979 to 1983 and since 1999 has not 
changed matters but rather increased the levels of corruption in Nigeria. Indeed the 
elections that brought them to power were highly dubious, as has always been the 
case in Nigerian elections. As academic Dr Iyayi lamented, ‘It is regrettable that the 
country has never witnessed a conclusive free and fair elections that what the country 
had witnessed since independence was a failed elections” (Amokeodo & Soniyi, 
2004, pp. 1-2).  
It is widely accepted that the 2003 elections that brought members of the National 
Assembly and the executive to power were anything but credible and that the 
integrity of these elections was highly compromised (Erakhuemen 2004, p. 1). A 
number of dubious and fraudulent tactics were employed in collaboration with INEC 
officials and a partisan Nigerian police force, to the utter disillusionment of both the 
local and international election monitors who were unfortunate enough to witness the 
charade. Newspapers published a number of reports of electoral fraud and 
irregularities (for example, see Jason 2003, p. 2; Omo-Abu 2003, p. 2; Ganago 2005, 
pp. 2-3; Ajayi 2005, p. 1), making it difficult to accept the Obasanjo government’s 
claims to legitimacy. (Erakhuemen 2004, p. 2). 
It is widely believed that the reason Nigerians seek government positions is not to 
serve the nation but for financial gain. Many will spend millions buying their way to 
87 
into power, an investment based on the expectation of being able to access 
government funds when they get in to office.  
The Nigerian press regularly reports on corrupt practices by government officials, 
often with little effect (see, for example, Jalil 2003, p. 1; Onwukwe 2003, p. 1; 
Oduyela 2004, p. 1; Adesina & Madunagu 2004, p. 1). One Nigerian newspaper 
summarised the situation in this way: 
It is ironic that a country whose economy cannot generate the income to pay a 
debt of $36 billion can boast of citizens who have in foreign banks $107 
billion and property worth $63 billion. Few creditors, especially those who 
believe that the money came from the looting of the public treasury and that 
nothing is been done even now to stop the looting would be willing to write 
off the debts of such a nation. That is the point that ICAN was trying to make 
but the government appeared to have missed (‘Government looted funds’, 
ThisDay, 21 October 2003, p.1). 
It is clear that elections in Nigeria have been characterised by corruption and violence 
right since independence, leading to calls for political reform, including an electoral 
body that is truly independent of government funding, influence and interference in it 
operations. The need for a federal constitution with sound electoral rules that 
guarantee free and fair elections is vital in instilling confidence in the system. 
Another pressing issue is the need for public disclosure of both how campaigns are 
financed and the financial interests of candidates  
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So far there has been little to show from the federal government’s avowed desire to 
tackle the issue of corruption in the administration of the country. The current 
president has been reluctant to take the allegations of fraud among his colleagues 
seriously. The Independence Corrupt Practice Commission, ‘a commission that seeks 
to prohibit and prescribe punishment for corrupt practices and other related offences’, 
was replaced with a very weak Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Bill 
2003 and the federal government established the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission to prosecute those found guilty of any financial crimes. However, this 
has been widely criticised as a ploy to remove and attack some certain individuals, 
state governors, local government chairmen and other party members seeking to 
restructure the Nigeria polity. Other Nigerian Newspaper reporters made similar 
reports (for example Fawibe 2005; Sonowo 2004; Olaleye 2005, p. 1; Epia 2005, p. 1; 
Alli 2005, pp. 1-3).  
Tellingly, since the present regime declared its fight against corruption no public 
officer or individual has been found guilty and punished (Ganago 2005). Odogwo 
(2005) is one of many commentators lamenting the extent of corruption and the 
inability of the government to address it: 
Which side of the scoreboard is anybody interested in looking? How about the 
Military Pensions, National Housing Fund, Privatization Share Purchases, 
National Identity Card, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)? 
What about the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), the Nigeria 
Telecommunications (NITEL) and its contract with Pentascope, Missing Ship 
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and Oil Bunkering? The March 27, 2005 Daily Independence Online reported 
about $22 million said to be lodged in a bank account owned by the 
president’s son Gbenga Obasanjo. On the National Assembly side, the Deputy 
Senate President Ibrahim Mantu and Senator Jonathan Zwingina were accused 
by Mallam el Rufai, the former Minister, and Federal Capital Terrritory 
(FCT). Both men were said to have solicited and insisted on a ₦54 million 
bribe to facilitate Rufai’s confirmation as minister. Ibrahim Mantu himself is 
alleged to own a 5-star hotel in the Gambia. 
5.2 Money politics 
Money politics, or the use of large sums of money to win elections to public office, 
has acquired a unique form of notoriety in Nigeria politics. In recent years,this type of 
political competition has become an important aspect of the country’s political 
culture. Given the fact that this approach is not well understood and also because 
social scientists are still to fully conceptualise it policy measures adopted to deal with 
it have proven ineffective.  
Politics everywhere involves the use of money by contesting candidates, 
political parties and the electoral commissions. Most developed countries, 
including the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Germany and Italy, have 
an established system that stipulates and limits the amount of money 
individuals, candidates and political parties can contribute to support an 
electoral campaign, and which requires that all donations or spending are 
publicly disclosed (Brademas 1999, p. 2).  
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Nigerian politics involves the use of huge, unregulated amounts of money in 
campaigns, meaning that only the rich or those sponsored by them are able to venture 
into politics. There are frequent reports of bribes being paid to electoral officers and 
police and intimidation of other party representatives at polling stations on election 
days.  
The last Nigerian general election was no exception. For example, the Obasanjo-
Atiku re-election campaign reportedly received a ‘Businessmen and Federal 
Government Contractors’ donation of ₦1 billion each, a ₦400 million donation from 
a construction company, and the donation of a 150-seat Boeing 727 by Dasab 
Airlines. The serving ministers in Obasanjo’s cabinet received donations of ₦10 
million while the twenty-one PDP governors received donations of ₦210 million 
(Ajayi 2003, p. 2).  
The ‘political godfather’ is a prominent feature of Nigerian political life. Together 
they comprise a small but highly influential and wealthy group within Nigerian 
society who routinely influence the outcome of elections by mobilising their 
enormous wealth and political connections. Most are simply self-seeking individuals 
who aim to use the government for their own purposes, wielding tremendous 
influence over the politicians they sponsor. They are often accused of hijacking the 
economic and political machinery to their own advantage. Okoye (2003) likened their 
regionally-based influence to that of the Sicily’s Mafia on Italian politics:  
The ‘political godfather’ in this context is a clique of well-placed and 
influential personages of Anambra state origin, who claim to have right 
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political connection with powers that be at Abuja. Most often they adopt a 
mafia-related approach in achieving their entrenched pecuniary interest…. 
These political godfathers exhibit common characteristics, thus the money-
bags, they sponsor or influence the sponsoring of candidates during elections. 
The cost of this incidence is enormous to the state as what usually obtains is 
that when the incumbent godson is at pain to satisfy the whims and caprices of 
the godfather among other competing demands on the scarce resources of the 
government, the interest of the larger number is savagely undermined (p. 1). 
These godfathers are often rewarded with substantial contracts and incentives from 
federal and state governments.  
Tope, a presidential aide in the 1999-2003 tenure, was Chief Operating 
Officer of Sahara Petroleum that was awarded most cargoes imported during 
the period…. Strangely Dangote Industries was given a huge 40% discount in 
price of gas to be supplied to its new cement factories. No other industry has 
gotten this form of incentive and discretionary treatment. The big man ordered 
for all hands to be on deck to ensure immediate delivery of gas at less than 
cost price (Sanusi 2005). 
Politicians who do not comply with the wishes of their godfather may be removed via 
the courts (which may also be bought) or other more violent means. The refusal by 
Governor Chris Ngege of Anambra State to pass on a share of his state allocation to 
his political Godfather led his kidnapping in a terrorist-style operation reportedly 
arranged by the brother-in-law of the president (Sanusi 2005).  
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Other politicians have been accused of taking out loans to finance their election 
campaign and thereafter stealing government money to repay their debts and boost 
their personal accounts. Ehikioya (2004) reported: 
Recently, the senate president confirmed the notion that to be a lawmaker in 
Nigeria is an investment. His view is that, in such an investment, you not only 
try to recoup the huge electoral expenses, you also ensure a good return on 
such investment (p. 1). 
Jide Ajani, a political editor with the Vanguard Online newspaper, observed that the 
immunity granted to public office holders makes a mockery of anti-corruption 
measures:  
Whereas so much noise is being made about the exploits of the Independent 
Corrupt Practices Commission, as well as the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission, in investigating and attempting to bring to justice public office 
holders looting treasury, the continued existence of Section 308 of the 
Constitution that gives immunity to public office holders makes their efforts a 
fools errand, at least until such public officers leaves office (2004). 
In most cases the government denies corruption allegations against public officers. A 
case in point was the denial by President Obasanjo of a former military head-of-
state’s alleged corruption between 1985 and 1993. Nigeriaworld columnist Dr. Femi 
Ajayi quoted President Obasanjo as saying that, ‘speculations and rumours on 
allegations of wrongdoings in coffee shops and market places, not one of these 
allegations have been substantiated’ (2005, p.1).  
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Most times, most allegations lead to the setting up of commissions of inquiry and in 
some cases the person(s) accused have been dismissed but their spoils remain 
untouched. The president once stated: 
I have never said that any investigation is absolutely perfect. But you tell me 
how many Nigerian has admitted wrong. If the Senator from Abia state and 
the minister hadn’t spoken out, they would have denied receiving any money. 
They would have turned the case against the government (Ajayi 2005, p. 3). 
 As things stand today, it is argued the federal government appears not to really want 
to tackle the issue of corruption in the administration of the country as transparently 
as it should (for example Onwukwe 2003, pp. 1-3; Olaleye 2005, p. 1; Epia 2005, p. 
1; Sonowo 2004; Fawibe 2005, p. 2). The President does not take the issue of fraud 
within his clique seriously when such allegations come up. Moreover, opponents 
have claimed that the president is using an anti-corruption crusade to prosecute his 
political opponents.  
The plundering of government funds is worst at the federal level but has also spread 
to lower levels of government. Since 1999, six years in to civilian government, the 
Independence Corrupt Practices Commission has been unable to complete 
investigations and prosecute governors indicted for fraud. State governors have been 
accused of misusing allocations meant for the development projects in their states and 
sending the money to their private accounts in foreign countries.  
The 1999 Constitution introduced a new complication into the system through its 
prescription of the state/local government joint account. States have in several 
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instances deprived local councils of their approved shares of funds accruing from the 
federal account. The newspaper ThisDay (2004) editorialised on this issue: 
… the trouble, it would appear, is that some state governors have been very 
extravagant in making spurious deductions from the funds meant for the local 
governments. In some instances, the state governments impose financial 
responsibilities on the councils that are not permitted by either the constitution 
or any law enacted by the assigned state assembly. Sometimes the governors 
are said to keep for themselves as much as 95 percent of the original revenue 
from the federation account, leaving only five percent to the councils (p. 2). 
Of the small amount of funds that are eventually disbursed to the councils by the 
states, much is misused. According to Okafor (2004), local government secretariats 
around the country have over time created opportunity for ambitious but illiterate or 
barely literate men and women in the village. Educational limitations, in most cases, 
circumscribe the developmental vision that these office holders bring to bear on their 
work- in the conceptualisation of projects, planning and execution. Indices of social 
development and critical success factors are unknown to them in some cases, and the 
common tendency is to divert financial resources into worthless undertaken. Today, 
even with the competitive salaries and benefits of council chairmen and councillors, 
the right calibre of personnel is lacking in most secretariats (p. 1). 
The federal government has at times attempted to discredit state governors from 
opposing political parties by withholding allocations meant for these states, causing 
these states to fail in their development programs. In some cases this may pave the 
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way for the ruling party at the federal level to instigate impeachment procedures or 
call for state elections to be held (Okafor 2004, p. 2). This situation is similar in all of 
Nigeria’s 774 local governments, with little social and infrastructure development to 
show for the funds received from the federal account. Elaigwu (2002), for example, 
argued that, ‘[m]any governors claim that a majority of chairmen and councillors of 
local governments only sit down to share money drawn from the Federation Account 
and hardly embark on development projects’ (p. 82). 
The perceived failures of local government have generated considerable discussion as 
to who should oversee local governments, an issue that was not clearly set out in the 
constitution.  
5.3 Insecurity and human rights abuses  
The level of insecurity in Nigeria is alarming. Numerous prominent political leaders 
have been assassinated, usually without the perpetrators being brought to justice by 
the authorities. A case in point is the manner in which Iyiola Omisore, (Deputy 
Governor of Oyo State) emerged as a senator of the Federal Republic. He won an 
election he was technically unqualified to contest: from prison awaiting trial for the 
murder of a former justice minister (Ganago 2003). Another example occurred in 
1990 when Colonel Odeleke, husband of Bola Odeleke died suspiciously in a hit-and-
run accident, after which the family was not allowed to carry out a post-mortem. 
(Oduyela 2003). More recently Uche Orji, a senate candidate for the All Nigeria 
People’s Party, was killed in the wake of the 2003 elections and Harry Marshal, a 
former chieftain of People Democratic Party and later co-ordinator of the All 
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Nigeria’s People Party presidential campaign in South-South, was murdered in his 
Abuja home (Oduyela 2003; Ganago 2005).  
What is disturbing is that during Obasanjo’s presidency the police have not been able 
or willing to solve political assassination cases. Because perpetrators are rarely 
caught and political assassinations are often made to look like accidents or disguised 
as random criminal acts it is difficult to ascertain the number of political murders 
conducted in Nigeria, but rarely does a month pass in which a politician is not killed. 
Indeed according to one report there were more murder cases in the first four years of 
civilian government after 1999 than in any other four-year period in the country’s 
history (Obiagwu & Onwubiko 2004). In fact between May 1999 and July 2001 252 
cases of extra-judicial killing by the police and other security agencies were recorded, 
which is far higher than in the last military regimes.  
There have been several recent massacres by the military. In three days in October 
2001, Nigerian soldiers killed more than 200 unarmed civilians in Gbeji, Zaki-Biam 
and several other towns and villages in Benue State, in a well-organised reprisal 
operation following the abduction and killing of nineteen soldiers by an armed group. 
The soldiers also destroyed hundreds of houses and other buildings in the area. The 
events in Benue were similar to those of a military reprisal operation in November 
1999 in Odi, Bayelsa State. Following the murder of twelve policemen, soldiers went 
on a rampage and killed hundreds of civilians. To date no-one has been prosecuted 
for either atrocity (Takirambudde 2002, p. 4). 
97 
It could be argued that the main reason why Nigeria has not been able to progress 
despite a large population and vast natural resources is due to the absence of a well-
articulated national security policy. This policy failure has been disastrous, with 
people losing lives and properties every day.  
Nigeria leaders have tended to make decisions on an ad hoc basis, as dictated by the 
immediate circumstances and as a result they have generally been reactive rather than 
proactive in guiding Nigeria’s future. This type of approach to nation-building often 
leads to political, social, economic, religious and military problems due to the often 
irrational and haphazard nature of the decisions taken, and this has certainly been the 
case in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, Nigeria’s police force has often been a tool in the hand of the federal 
government and used to intimidate the populace and opposition parties, rather than 
serve the public in their interests. Part of the argument for decentralisation is that 
police powers should rest at the level of government closest to those being policed, 
which is why in many countries policing issues are the responsibility of state or local 
government. Decentralisation of police powers would work effectively in a multi-
ethnic nation such as Nigeria, with officers drawn from the local areas in which they 
will operate. Decentralisation of the police forces could arguably improve the ratio of 
police to the general population, which is well below the United Nations target 
(Adeyemi 2005).  
Multinational companies have also been involved in human rights abuses in Nigeria. 
Ohia (1999) noted that Shell has engaged in paramilitary activity to subdue the oil 
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producing communities and continues its environmental damage for their economic 
interest as have other oil companies:  
Chevron Nigeria gave out its helicopters and boats to Nigeria military to crack 
down on the civil populace of the oil communities. Dumez (Nigeria) Limited, 
a road construction company employs security forces to attack villagers and is 
destroying newly planted crops of local farmers without paying compensation 
for crops or carrying out any environmental impact assessment. Julius Berger, 
a German construction company in Nigeria is not left out in this case. They 
left their original mission and are involved in sales of arms and money 
laundering and other illegal businesses (p. 2).  
Multinational’s activities have negatively impacted on Nigeria’s environment, 
economy and political life over more than four decades.  
With the involvement of Shell, the matter has taken a different tone; the Anglo–Dutch 
international business concern had become a collaborator with corrupt governments 
in Nigeria to fraudulently explore our crude oil in accordance to the dictate of their 
corporate headquarters. Their activities have negatively impacted on Nigeria’s 
environment. Shell and other multinationals has refused to abide to international 
business ethic, they engage in sponsoring local politicians and youth gangs working 
in tandem with government security forces in desperate attempts to force its way into 
most communities (Ganago 2004).  
99 
Expatriate engineers are sent to work in Nigeria and paid in foreign currencies and 
most of the machinery used is also imported. In this manner, revenue from crude oil 
is repatriated to Europe and America. Nwokedi (2005) observed: 
In Africa and Nigeria in particular it is a game of cat and mouse, a game of 
pray and predator. They have become a ready replacement for colonization 
and in some cases outright slavery…. For example Royal Dutch become 
prominent in Nigeria after the colonial master. In absence genuine concession 
and firm agreements with national interest in mind their presence is merely a 
replacement of colonial powers…. Most oil companies could not operate 
successfully in a stable and organised third world country. They prefer chaotic 
and anarchic situation because it helps to draw attention away from their 
activities. Usually the corrupt government is kept in power by the host 
country while the government in turn provides protection for the oil company. 
Shell is known to be a major source of endless corruption and conflicts in 
Nigeria (see also Ohlsson 2002). 
After many years in which these adverse effects either received scant attention or 
were simply ignored, fresh efforts have been mounted in recent years by 
environmentalist non-governmental organisations to address the situation. Shell 
appears to have acknowledged that its practices in Nigeria have fuelled conflicts. A 
British newspaper quoted a leaked Shell report in which Mr. Emmanuel Etomi, the 
Sustainable Development Manager for Shell Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria accepted that the company had been:  
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… ‘inadvertently contributing’ to the conflict in the country. In 2003 Shell 
enlisted three internationally known conflict experts to better understand how 
our activities are affected by and contribute to the conflict. The experts 
highlighted ‘how Shell sometimes feed conflict by the way we award 
contracts, gain access to land and deal with community representatives; how 
drastically conflict reduces’ the effect of our community development 
program (Ganago 2004). 
Since independence, political observers have long complained of external influence in 
the administration of Nigeria by Western nations pursuing their own economic 
interests (Nwokedi 2005). Opposition parties have regularly accused Nigerian 
governments of being puppets of Western governments who, along with their 
representatives, multinational corporations, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, have contributed to the underdevelopment of Nigeria (Nwokedi 
2005).  
5.4 Self-perpetuation and military involvement in politics 
In Nigeria political power and influence can be maintained across different regimes. 
For example:  
Obasanjo has been around power since the 1960s, he was the military head of 
state for 3 years (1976 -1979), and he was the first military leader to hand 
over power to a democratically elected government in Africa (not succeeding 
himself). Obasanjo then came back to power as a civilian in 1999 in a new 
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attempt at democracy by Nigeria till date (after many years of stealing and 
looting by military dictators) (Awodele 2006). 
While the means of entering government may have changed, little else about the 
current regime is fundamentally different to earlier periods of military rule. Across 
the continent many political leaders in Africa have been able to stay in power for 
decades by selectively embracing aspects of democracy to legitimate fundamentally 
undemocratic governments. For example, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has been in 
power since 1978, Libya’s Gaddafi came to power in 1969 and has ruled his country 
since, Husni Mubarak of Egypt has been president since 1981 and has contested 
elections in which he was the only candidate (until the 2005 elections), while 
Gnasingbe Eyadema of Togo ruled from 1969 and was succeeded by his son. 
Meanwhile, President Museveni of Uganda has just amended the constitution and is 
serving a third term, and the ruling parties in South Africa and Nigeria are pushing 
for similar amendments so that there political leaders can remain in power beyond the 
maximum term stipulated in their constitutions (Awodele 2006). 
The excessive military involvement in Nigerian politics continues to hinder 
development in every aspect of life. Former military and serving senior officers have 
tremendous influence over social and economic policy and many of those who are 
contesting elections, or who have already won political office in the current civilian 
governments, are former senior military officers. For example, Muhammadu Buhari, 
a former military dictator famous for launching an authoritarian ‘war on indiscipline’, 
used a government-owned office to contest ‘an election campaign dominated by 
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former senior army officers who present themselves as the most suitable managers of 
a country in crisis of corruption, poverty and volatility’. (Peel 2003, p.3). 
5.5 Aggressive sub-nationalism and the politics of resource control 
In the absence of political reform in Nigeria, aggressive sub-national responses of 
various types have erupted in many parts of the country. There is a long history of 
agitation by successionist movements in Nigeria. This first was led by Isaac Adaka 
Boro shortly after the January 1966 coup when he declared the Niger Delta Republic, 
a move made to liberate the Niger Delta people from the oppression of the then 
eastern-dominated federal government. Further attempts at secession have been made 
in different parts of the country, including an attempt by General Odumegu Ojukwu, 
a military officer from the southeast, which led to civil war.  
Since the 1999 handover of power to civilian government, latent aggressive sub-
nationalism has exploded into violence. This was a resurgence of sub-nationalism that 
had been suppressed under the previous military regime of Abacha and was fuelled in 
many ways by the emergence of a fiscally and politically dominant centre which 
undermined the basic sense of security of many groups around the country. 
After May 1999, the O’dua Peoples Congress (OPC) from the southwest declared its 
stand for the freedom of Yorubas to go it alone as an independent nation. It declared 
its desire to protect and defend Yoruba interests anywhere in Nigeria. The first 
eruption of violence was in Shagamu, a town in western Nigeria, between an OPC-
backed group and Hausa settlers. Many people were killed and goods were destroyed. 
The corpses of Hausa men that were carried back to the northern town of Kano 
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sparked a retaliatory wave of violence in that city against Yorubas. In response, 
northern youths formed the Arewa People’s Congress (APC) to challenge OPC 
violence, while in Lagos angry Ibos set up the Ibo People’s Congress (IPC) to deal 
with what they considered OPC’s unwarranted meddling and violence. Most 
Nigerians saw the OPC’s espousal of Yoruba nationalism as propaganda behind 
which to hide from police (BBC 2003, p. 1). 
Another recent secession bid was made by Chief Ralph Uwazuruike from 
southeastern Nigeria, who sought secession under the Movement for the 
Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), a non-violent civil rights 
movement. Chief Uwazuruike has stressed that the non-violent method was chosen so 
as not to offend the United Nations and a Biafra Bill of Rights was sent to the global 
body, which had visited Nigeria to monitor things situation themselves. MASSOB 
members are active internationally and in the United States Radio Biafra broadcast 
the activities of the Biafra Republic on a daily basis. In the Eastern part of Nigeria 
and some parts of neighbouring countries where the agitation for self-determination is 
very strong the Biafran pound is still in use.  
The mere gathering of any group of Igbo people anywhere in Nigeria today is liable 
to be seen by authorities as Biafran independence activists holding meeting. In 2004 a 
football tournament organised by a group of Igbo traders in Lagos State was said to 
be a Biafra meeting and everyone in attendance, including the players and those 
selling bottled water around the pitch, were arrested and are presently being tried for 
treason (Anaba & Charles 2005, p. 1).  
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Fear of secession and regional sub-aggressiveness was recently heightened when 
Mujahid Dokubo Asari, a militia leader of Ijaw origin, successfully marked the death 
of Isaac Boro despite police warnings. In February 2005 Asari threatened to declare 
war and ordered all crude oil flow stations closed until the federal government agreed 
to develop the Niger-Delta. This led to an increase in crude oil prices before Asari 
was flown by presidential jet to meet the president Olushegu Obasanjo and an 
agreement was reached. But his recent pronouncements have prompted a tightening 
of security measures in the Niger-Delta as he has been preparing war-like tactics for 
achieving self-determination, while the US has positioned a war ship in the Gulf of 
Guinea to safeguard its economic interests in the region.  
If the threatened secession of the coastal regions were to succeed the north would be 
landlocked and this could lead to civil war as most of the defence installations, arms 
and ammunitions are located there. A second argument against secession is that when 
the crude oil in the south eventually dries up, as has happened in Oloibiri (where 
commercial quantities of crude oil were first discovered in the Niger-Delta region in 
1967), the south may need to rely on income from the numerous solid mineral 
deposits in the north.  
Since military rule, the Niger-Delta has been an area of violence. Devastated by oil 
exploration, inadequately compensated, and overwhelmed by an army of unemployed 
youth, the area has seen violence aimed at extracting positive responses from the 
federal government and oil companies. At various times, oil pipelines have been 
sabotaged while communities involved in illegal siphoning of crude oil from 
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pipelines have suffered tragic consequences resulting from unexpected explosions 
and inferno.  
In the South-South there is the Niger-Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, a militia group 
operating in the riverine area where oil exploration takes place. This group is headed 
by Alhaji Dokubo Asari, who in October 2005 led his group in violet agitation and 
was said to be prepared to blow up oil installations in the Niger-Delta region. As the 
government appeared to be uncomfortable with his claims and his preparedness a 
special envoy was sent by the federal government to bring him for discussions in the 
federal capital.  
Similarly, the middle-belt (the north-central zone) has reacted to a number of issues. 
The trigger for middle-belt anger was the complaint by core Hausa-Fulani that service 
chiefs of the armed forces were drawn from the middle-belt and not from the north. 
This prompted spontaneous reactions to what was regarded as northern hypocrisy: 
using the middle-belt when it was convenient to fight its war, and then turning on 
them. The Middle-Belt Forum that followed made it clear that it was no longer 
interested in being part of the old northern geo-polity or in sharing identity with the 
Hausa-Fulani (The Nigerian Standard (Jos) 17th August, 2000, p. 7). The middle-belt 
has supported a federation with a strong centre but with equality of opportunity. It 
called for equity in the distribution of resources and the need to encourage solid-
minerals, agricultural, and industrial development in the region. Like the southeast, 
southwest and south-south zones, the middle-belt has called for a national conference 
to discuss all outstanding issues in the Nigerian federation. 
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Arguably, Nigeria’s federal government is playing politics with the nation’s natural 
resources, with eighty percent of its income from the sale of crude oil from the Niger 
Delta. Resource control was the most prominent issue for the state governors from the 
Niger-Delta at a national conference organised by the federal government.  
The extent of secessionist activity in Nigeria is evidence of the extent to which many 
regions have been dissatisfied with the existing federal administrative governance and 
its ongoing fragility in multicultural Nigeria.  
5.6 Treatment of the media 
The Abacha government (1993–99) has been the most publicly criticised for its 
treatment of the media. This volatile relationship between government and the media 
has continued in the Obasanjo administration, with offices and premises of some 
media houses invaded and copies of their newspapers and magazines seized by state 
security agents. Most journalists are prevented access to the Presidential Villa 
reportedly on grounds that they refuse to co-operate in government cover-ups 
syndrome (Ojedokun 2003, p. 2). Ganago (2005) described one recent case of media 
intimidation:  
In just five days between September 4 and 9, the State Security Service (SSS) 
came down hard on some media outfits in a manner suggestive of repression 
and disrespect to the Nigeria Constitution. In one instance, the SSS stormed 
the premises of the Insider Weekly magazine, arrested three of its staff and 
laid siege on it, effectively shutting it down. In another instance … an 
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editorial consultant to the Global Weekly Star, another weekly newspaper, 
was reportedly arrested and detained since then. 
Nigeria’s newspapers often publish reports of inhumane treatment of journalists (for 
example see Obijiofor 2003, p. 2; Mbidoaka 2004). 
The National Assembly has attempted another version of press censorship by 
introducing a General Code of Conduct for National Assembly Correspondents. In 
part, the provisions of the code read that ‘speculative journalism will attract punitive 
action’ and ‘leaking of official secret documents will attract disciplinary measures’. 
These directives are not in any way different from the decree under which the 
Buhari/Idiagbon government jailed journalists, Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor, 
in 1984. Nor are they different from the decree invoked in 1993 by Abacha to 
sentence four journalists to death, as accessories after the fact of treason (Fawibe 
2003, p. 2). Recently, three journalists covering protests against the increase in prices 
of petroleum products were arrested and brutalised by the police for no just cause. 
Despite the criticisms of these senseless displays of aggression by the police no 
explanation has come from any official quarters despite these actions having been co-
ordinated by an assistant inspector-general of police.  
Normally, the police are constituted as an agent of government responsible for 
arresting perpetrators of crime. However, in Nigeria it is completely different. Police 
commit all kinds of atrocities, ranging from the illegal mounting of roadblocks to 
murder, intimidation, and robbery (Onwukwe 2005). Newspapers in Nigeria regularly 
publish reports of maltreatment at the hands of the police (for example see Obijiofor 
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2003, pp. 1-3; Ojedokunn 2003, p. 1). Onwukwe (2005) expressed a frustration with 
the role of the Nigerian police force that reflects widely held concerns: 
While the Inspector General of Police is playing the role of an accountant for 
the police, the murders of Ige and Marshall Harry have still not been resolved. 
The murders of several high profile individuals have not been solved. The 
police as usual will come promising to find the killers and bringing them to 
book. After the outrage dies down, they return to their usual inactivity until 
another politician is gunned down and then we go through the same 
motions…They take bribes, they kill over meagre sums, sometimes as small 
as ₦30. They rob and mistreat Nigerians all because the [Inspector General] 
has misappropriated funds meant for the upkeep of the Nigerian police force 
(p. 2). 
In the same vain, the people of Ikot Effaga Mkpa community in the Cross River state 
are at loggerheads with the state police command over the cold-blooded murder of 
one of the community’s leaders, who was killed at his residence by a team of 
policemen led by an assistant superintendent of police (Eno-Abasi 2003, p. 2).  
On the other hand it appears some journalists and media houses have become 
mouthpieces for corrupt politicians and dishonest businessmen. There is a growing 
trend in Nigeria for members of the press to accept bribes in return for reporting 
stories differently, while those journalists that refuse to be compromised can be 
denied accreditation to cover government activity. This is the bane of the Nigerian 
press today (Ihenacho 2003). 
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5.7 Public debt burden 
Since 1960 successive governments, whether a military or civilian, have sought out 
foreign loans. As a result Nigeria, despite its huge mineral resources, is among the 
world’s most indebted countries. As of August 2003 the nation total debt stood at 
US$31 billion (Ozomena 2003, p. 1). Nigeria faces enormous debt repayment and 
penalties for defaulting on these repayments and it is clear that the these loans were 
not always used for their intended purpose when one considers the poor nature of 
social infrastructure, health care facilities, high rate of unemployment and depressed 
economic situation.  
Further confirmation of this came from Chief Olu Falae, secretary to the federal 
military government (1985–90), who announced after a debt verification exercise that 
over ₦30 billion (or US$4.5 billion) of Nigeria’s external debt was found to be 
‘fraudulent and spurious’ (Ebeh 1994, p. 7). A 2003 newspaper report summed up the 
country’s financial position: 
The report that the Federal Government owes contractors about ₦1 trillion and 
another ₦2 trillion backlog to pensioners, added to the US$31 billion 
indebtedness to foreign creditors should alarm all of us. First, the domestic as 
well as the foreign debts represent substantial increase over the figures 
inherited by this administration in 1999. At that time, the foreign debt was 
US$28 billion while the domestic component was under ₦800 billion. Every 
annual budget has included provision for the settlement of outstanding debts 
which everyone expects would have been adequate for the discharge of those 
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obligations as at when due. That the liabilities are rising should have been 
worrisome by itself (‘Trillion Naira debts: National Assembly must act now’, 
Vanguard (Lagos), 11 September 2003). 
So Nigeria, a country endowed with rich natural resources, is ranked among the 
poorest countries in the world. However, despite this poverty the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation reported in 2004 that individual Nigerians have 
about US$107 billion deposited in foreign banks. This amounts to an estimated 70 
percent of the nation’s total private wealth (Adesina & Madunagu 2004, p. 1; 
Odeyemi 2004). The country’s plight has been exacerbated by the conditions imposed 
by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Nwokedi (2005) observed: 
For 20 years debt has been serviced by half of the country’s annual income. Almost 
90% of Nigeria export is from crude oil and the price of oil is determined by the same 
western powers that buy them. Of the ten cruel strategies adopted by the IMF to 
derail Nigeria, debt is the meanest. It is the final nail that sealed the Nigerian’s coffin. 
The unfortunate African nation, even though it had no capital project at hand to 
finance, was lured into their debt or death trap in the 80s when it was forced to accept 
a debt burden of about US$28 billion. Since then it has been paying about US$5 
billion every year in debt servicing alone. After 23 years and over 100 billion dollars 
siphoned without mercy, Nigeria still has the same amount in debt hovering above 
US$30 billion. Specifically Nigeria has paid their debt three times over but still has 
the same amount left. To make things worse it is even against IMF and World Bank’s 
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rule for any debtor to pay off their debt even if they have the money (p. 4). (See also 
Akintunde 2005, p. 1)  
Recently the Paris Club of creditors agreed to reduce Nigeria’s external debt stock by 
sixty percent. In effect, about $18 billion of the $30.848 billion external debt owed to 
fourteen members of the club has been cancelled. Also the leaders of the G8 countries 
have pledged $50 billion for the development and eradication of poverty from Africa.  
The arrangement of having a general accounting system for the whole country is 
undemocratic, catering to the interests of the few rather the needs of the majority, 
particularly in rural areas. Regions need their own accounting systems in conjunction 
with the federal system. The tax system also requires an overhaul to be effective 
especially in its application to government officials, federal government contractors, 
government agencies and companies (Ekpunobi 2005, p. 1; Nwankwo 2005, p. 1).  
Given these problems, Nigerians are clamouring for a national conference of all 
ethnic groups to develop a strategy for restructuring the polity and to lay the 
foundations for an effective administration that will benefit all. The call for a 
Sovereign National Conference shows the extent to which the various ethnic 
nationalities were dissatisfied with the centralised system of administration in 
Nigeria. Diverse groups of Nigerians at various times have called for the need to 
convene a conference to discuss the fundamental issue of restructuring the nation’s 
polity, power sharing and co-existence, resource control and the role of traditional 
institutions.  
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The call for a Sovereign National Conference started after the counter coup of 15 July 
1966 when the Igbo of the south-eastern Nigeria threatened to secede over 
restructuring. A meeting was convened in Aburi in Ghana but the Nigerian 
government refused to implement the agreement reached at that meeting. Between 
1985 and 1993 the head of state set up a conference by appointing delegates that went 
round the country, consulting with different people in every ethnic group. The effort 
and recommendations of the bureau was not put into practice as it was not in the 
interest of the head of state.  
After the annulment of the 12th June 1993 general election, another military head of 
state took over and quickly convene a constitutional conference. Delegates from the 
conference came up with a formula and recommend a rotational system of 
administration for Nigeria, similar to that in use in the European Union. The 
recommendation was stage-managed and later put aside.  
Similarly, the present civilian government has set up its own conference. Pro-
democracy groups have have organised their own conference, angered that 
representatives invited to successive government-organised conferences since 
independence do not reflect the choices of the ethnic groups they are supposed to 
represent (Okoror 2003). Opposition groups observe that most of the delegates to the 
most recent conference have also been appointed as delegates to many of previous 
conferences, hence the outcome was dictated by the regime that organised it. As 
Oduyela (2005) puts it: 
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I do not need to go into personalities but it is clear that these people are 
representatives of the ‘Owners of Nigeria’ camouflaging as the masses 
representative in helping to renew the mandate of the ‘Owners of Nigeria’. 
They are negotiating our future again, mortgaging our children and the 
generation to in future on our expense, spending our taxes and oil money 
(p.3).  
Like previous conferences, the current president has placed an embargo on some 
sensitive areas of confrontation. In his statement, it appears that the recommendations 
will not be considered seriously. 
5.8 Summary and conclusion 
The chapter has clearly enumerated some of the obvious consequences brought about 
due to excessive centralisation of the Nigeria nation where powers are concentrated in 
the hands of the federal government. It was observed that Nigeria operated a 
centralised political, economic and financial system where the federal government 
dictate and distributes finance according to there wish to other levels of government. 
The excessive centralisation appears to have fuelled the struggle for political position 
by fraudulent means.  
As such, politicians and military politicians indulge in every avenue to contest and 
win elections either by rigging or buying votes during elections. This has intensified 
the use of huge sums of money for elections for them to recoup it when in office. It 
has also increased and brought other forms of corrupt practices such as looting of the 
nation’s treasury, embezzlement and misappropriation of fund meant for the 
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development of the country. The chapter points out how sequence of centralisation 
has further heightened the level of insecurity, while various sections of the country 
under different regional organisations are clamouring for restructuring. The call for 
restructuring has taken different forms such as frequent political and ethno-regional 
violence to more recently the use of arms in every part of the country. Media men 
who report corrupt activities are routinely beaten or killed. While the violent situation 
persists, the nation has incurred a huge debt despite the enormous mineral resources 
at its disposal. In the process, the roles of traditional institutions have not been made 
clear or given serious consideration. Their powers have been largely restricted to 
providing advice to government and for the conferment of chieftaincy titles.  
While the UK and India are culturally diverse they are less so than Nigeria, which has 
more than 300 recognisable cultures, each with its own languages and costumes 
(Honey and Okafor 1998, p. 3). About forty-five percent of the nation populations are 
Moslems (with different denominations), mostly based in the north, while another 
forty-five percent are Christians (of different denominations) based in the south. Ten 
percent are of indigenous belief and other religions. However it is the poor quality of 
Nigeria’s institutions which is the principle reason for its slow and uneven 
development. According to Easterly (2000): 
Poor institutions have an even more adverse effect on growth and policy when ethnic 
diversity is high…Ethnically diverse nations that wish to endure in peace and 
prosperity must build good institutions (p. 19).  
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As this thesis argues, a decentralised structure incorporating traditional institutions is 
the basis for strengthening the country’s administrative structures. These arguments 
are reviewed and summarised in the following chapter, while developments that are 
taking traditional institutions in to account are also examined 
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Chapter Six – Towards Institutional Reconciliation 
This chapter reviews the major themes of the study and emphasises the role of 
traditional institutions in the process of decentralisation in Nigeria. The chapter 
discusses the idea and importance of traditional reconciliation and indigenous 
knowledge in development. It also outlines the usefulness of traditional reconciliation 
in a diverse society such as Nigeria, as well as the limitations of the study and 
possible areas of future research. In analysing the formation and reformation of 
federal structures in Nigeria since its inception, it is clear that a truly decentralised 
administrative system remains a distant possibility. Despite the intent of various 
attempts at processes of decentralisation, these are yet to take hold. 
The interest in the role of institutional reconciliation/indigenous knowledge was 
inspired by the failure of governmental institutions to provide basic services, which 
have declined sharply in quality and quantity. Many states have variously been 
described as failed or collapsed at one time or another throughout their post-
independence lives. They have been variously been described as shadow states quasi-
states, criminalised states, disrupted states or collapsed states (Kimathi 2005, p. 2).  
The problem of governance and political instability in the Nigeria state is intractably 
rooted in the people’s view of their roles within the political system, their relationship 
to the state and the various cultural institutions. The Nigeria states and their various 
institutional structures have therefore enhanced the role of the imperial states in the 
international system without advancing the concepts of democratic governance and 
economic development in Nigeria. So invariably the structural disconnect between 
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the formal institutions transplanted from outside and the indigenous institutions born 
of the culture and traditional values of the Nigerian past hinders the socio-political 
and economic development of Nigeria state.   
The Nigerian state can be classified as a failed state as there is no functional 
institution in place to counterbalance the power of the person that is heading the 
national government. The rule of law is not adhered to, and there is only minimal 
health, economic, financial and social infrastructures. Despite its huge mineral 
resources its citizens are living in abject poverty, largely due to the innefectiveness of 
public institutions. Billions of dollars are being budgeted for public works every year 
but there is virtually nothing on ground to show for it. The country is ranked among 
the poorest and most corrupt nations in the world as funds for development are 
diverted to the personal accounts of public officials. According to Njoku (2004): 
We are virtually the only country outside Saudi-Arabia in this world that that 
lives on nothing but the legacy of oil and yet we are the poorest. We are 
supposed to be the sixth largest oil producing nation in the world but we have 
remained poor (p.4).  
Interest in the role that traditional institutions/indigenous knowledge can play in truly 
participatory approaches to the development has increased drastically during recent 
years. This interest is reflected in the myriad of activities generated within 
communities that are recording their own knowledge for use in their educational 
systems and for planning purposes. Within national institutions traditional knowledge 
systems are now regarded as an invaluable national resources, and within the 
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development communities, where traditional knowledge provides opportunities for 
designing development projects that emerge from problems identified and assigned 
priority by the beneficiaries themselves, which builds upon and strengthens 
community-level knowledge systems. Recent titles such as Tradition as a Modern 
Strategy (Lund 1996), The Indigenization of Modernity (Sabbarwal 1999) and so on, 
reflect the growing interest accorded to culture and in current development thinking 
and research (Nwaka 2004, p. 383).  
The renewed interest in indigenous knowledge and institutions is in line with the 
current advocacy of the minimalist state and the ‘enabling approach’, as conditions 
for good governance in a period of structural adjustment and public sector reforms. 
Under pressure from civil society and the donor agencies governments are urged to, 
and obliged to reduce their role to what their dwindling resources and capacities 
permits (Opoku-Mensah 2004, p.9). This implies decentralising the structure of 
governance, promoting genuine partnership and enlisting the broad participation of 
non-state actors and stakeholders, including traditional institutions and other civil 
society/community-based organisations). 
This trend has been reinforced by the UNESCO-sponsored, ‘World Decade for 
Cultural Development’ (1988-1997), the Earth Summit in Rio de Janiero on 
Environment and Development (1992), and other global initiatives and debates that 
have stressed the cultural dimension of development, and the need to take local 
knowledge and practice fully into account in the development process (UNESCO 
1995; UN-Habitat 1998). 
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In his influential World Bank studies, Mamodou Dia, with his group, has argued that 
the most promising way to overcome the shortcomings of the state system and its 
alien formal institutions in Africa is to recognise ‘the structural and functional 
disconnect between the informal, indigenous institutions rooted in the regions history 
and culture, and formal institutions mostly transplanted from outside’ (Dia 1996, p. 
226 Francis et al. 1996, p. 34). The remedy he argued is to ensure ‘a reconnect 
between state and civil society’, and to identify the opportunities within indigenous 
institutions for building a more pluralistic and participatory form of governance and 
development. 
Ekeh (1975), in trying to drew a distinction between the morality of the civic public 
associated with colonial rule and alien institutions on one hand, and on the other the 
primitive public associated with traditional sentiments, values, and restraints in 
various indigenous societies and institutions, states: 
There is a general apathy and cynicism towards government, and some 
ambivalence about accountability in governance. By contract, the general 
attitude to the premodial realm (ethnic, clan, or village) is much more selfless 
and transparent, because of the cultural norms, obligations, and sanctions that 
come into play (p. 91). 
This partly explains the pervasiveness of ethnic and clan unions in the cities, with 
strong links to home towns. The argument then is that these traditional values 
attitudes and institutions should be consciously harnessed and brought to bear on 
governance and public affairs in the cities and other spheres of public life.  
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In the same way, Dia’s (1996) World Bank studies have urged for synergy or 
institutional reconciliation between state and community, through measures that 
increase the technical and organisational capacity of community institutions, and also 
create a more responsive and accountable public sector. Both formal and informal 
institutions are here to stay, and need to be more flexible in their relationship to each 
other. The formal sector and its institutions need to adapt to local conditions for 
greater legitimacy and enforceability, while informal sector institutions, in some 
cases, also need to be renovated and adjusted in order to remain relevant. Local 
institutions, which are sometimes handicapped by limited skill and resources, need 
support links to the budgetary and technical resources available in government and its 
numerous agencies. (p. 234) 
It is through this adaptation that formal and informal institutions can converge or be 
reconciled and build on each other’s strengths, reduce transaction costs and maximise 
institutional performance.  
6.1 The role of traditional governance and institutions  
Successive constitutional arrangements since 1914 have featured a centralised system 
of administration. The role of the traditional institutions and governance were not 
given serious consideration hence the 1995 Draft Constitution, which preferred the 
familiar (colonial) ways of establishing and maintaining links with culture, norms and 
values through traditional governance. The erosion of the powers of traditional 
institutions was most notable in 1979 when the appointment, promotion and payment 
of salaries of traditional rulers were enshrined into the 1979 constitution, in many 
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ways reducing the rulers to the status of public servants in the sense that they became 
directly answerable to the governments who appoint and pay them.  
Despite the relegation of traditional institutions, traditional rulers are still very 
powerful and influential. Consequently they are often asked by governments to 
appeal to the people in their regions for peace and co-operation with government 
authorities, to convey messages to the people, and to encourage participation in 
community development programs. Vaughan (2004) observes that, ‘Invented, 
appointed, promoted or not, traditional rulers wield enormous power and influence 
and have successfully manipulated state power holders for personal gain and 
corporate group gain’ (p. 93).  
It must, however, be admitted that the traditional unfettered powers of chiefs have 
undergone transformation as a result of colonial rule and the attempts by some post-
independence governments to influence the role of chiefs in political affairs. 
Consequently, the overall powers and authority of chiefs have ebbed and flowed 
depending on the regime preferences and dynamic changes in the chieftaincy roles 
themselves.  
Before colonialism, indigenous institutions in Nigeria governed the villages and cities 
in all of the regions that make up Nigeria today. However, these institutions now exist 
in different forms and are either traditional (i.e. from pre-colonial times) or relatively 
recent indigenous responses to the limitations of post-colonial state institutions. 
Examining the pattern and procedures for administrating some selected villages and 
cities in Nigeria, Olowu and Erero (1996) list three forms of indigenous institutions in 
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Nigeria: political and administrative institutions; socio-cultural organisations; and 
development and economic associations (p. 7).  
Indigenous political and administrative institutions play very useful roles in the 
governance of their communities. Often these consist of the traditional leadership 
structures as modified by colonial rule and post-independence governments. These 
institutions are also in every community in Nigeria. Their functions include the 
maintenance of law and order, the collection of taxes, the settlement of minor 
disputes (although most disputes now end up with the police and the courts), the 
supervision of the market (even though this function is now largely performed by a 
market chief appointed by the local government), and the endorsement or regulation 
of all land transactions. 
Indigenous socio-cultural organisations represent another form of 
traditional/indigenous organisations through which Nigerian communities govern 
themselves. These organisations are largely voluntary associations crafted locally for 
the peculiar needs of like-minded individuals or reflective of religious and gender 
solidarity. They provide welfare services to members in times of need. In this 
category could be included age-grade associations, which are used partly for 
socialisation and education of specific age-grades into roles they are to play in the 
community. They are also used for the implementation of decisions taken by superior 
institutions e.g. in respect of sanitation, construction of roads and buildings, and in 
the management of common pool resources. These associations exist in one form or 
another in all of Nigeria’s communities. 
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Indigenous development and economic associations are focused on infrastructure and 
economic development. These institutions could be traditional (i.e. pre-colonial) or 
relatively recent responses by the communities to the perceived weaknesses of the 
traditional structures on the one hand and the ineffectiveness of state-based structure 
on the other. These associations could be in the form of market women associations 
(especially in the southeast) that regulate markets and monitor the prices of goods or 
the Parakoyi chiefs who are in charge of commerce in the southwest. Others are trade 
and professional guilds, and thrift and credit associations (ESUSU). Community 
development associations, town/village associations and co-operatives also belong in 
this category. In some communities these associations not only assume political and 
administrative roles from the traditional structures, they have also been responsible 
for most of the self-help economic and development projects undertaken by 
community members themselves or in collaboration with state-based government 
structures. Successful associations have become pillars for directing youth in to 
productive activities, and for the initiation of peace meetings with neighbouring 
villages to resolve land and other conflicts. Francis et al. (1996) listed thirty-six such 
community organisations in Nigeria. The leaders of these associations are being 
enlisted by members of the community.  
Home-town associations, a form of ‘shadow state’, have been responsible for the 
building of schools, courthouses, primary health centres, roads, police posts post 
offices, and markets. They have also provided the impetus for direct economic 
activities such as community banking, fish farms, and construction of feeder roads to 
facilitate the movement of produce and goods to and from communities.  
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The lack of or inadequate integration of the central/formal and traditional/informal 
systems of governance has several implications for decentralisation and efforts to 
promote participatory democracy and rapid socio-economic development at the local 
government level. In particular the lack of formal representation of chiefs in local 
government has resulted in strained relations between some traditional chiefs and 
government officials and their communities. In some regions the governor or local 
government chairman and the traditional rulers are not on good terms while in others 
it is the traditional rulers and the members of the National Assembly or state House 
of Assembly who are at loggerheads (Ayee, cited in Boafo-Arthur 2001). 
The absence of traditional rulers in the working of state or local governments has 
meant that a potent force for mobilising communities at the local level is being 
wasted. Even though some researchers have generally described the relationship 
between government officials and traditional rulers in their electoral areas as cordial, 
other researchers such as Ayee (cited in Boafo-Arthur 2001) have indicated that this 
cordial relationship may not exist in all communities and regions. Co-operation and 
mutual respect are essential elements in the promotion of decentralised development, 
as well mobilising communities for development. 
6.2 Strengths of Nigeria’s traditional institutions 
In making the case for the incorporation of traditional governance/indigenous 
knowledge into modern governance, the real challenge is not to romanticise 
traditional government or over-idealise modern government, as both have their 
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strengths and limitations and should complement and not confront or undermine each 
other (Nwaka 2004, p. 384). Olowu and Erero (1996) observe that: 
A major strength of the indigenous institutions is their legitimacy which is 
recognised not only by community members, but also by government 
institutions and functionaries and ensures orderly succession to political 
office. This is closely followed by the fairly stable nature of indigenous 
institutions over time as opposed to state institutions which are stable (p14).   
Similarly Makepe (2006) reasoned that: 
 Traditional rulers enforce management responsibility and overseers of 
decentralised system. It also allows those with ultimate understanding of the 
people culture, norms and values so as to monitor and enforce rules pertaining 
development projects (p.44).   
The failure of past attempts at decentralisation in Nigeria program suggest the need 
for Dia’s ‘institutional reconciliation’ between state and community through 
measures that increase the technical and organisational capacity of community 
institutions, while creating a more responsive accountable public sector. Therefore, 
there are sound reasons for integrating traditional and modern systems of governance 
as a means of enhancing community and district development. This approach would 
strengthen rather than weaken the process of decentralisation.  
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A major strength of traditional institutions in Nigeria is their legitimacy, which is not 
only recognised by community members but also by government institutions and 
functionaries over time. Head Heeb (2003) puts it this way:  
The Sardauna of Sokoto and the Alaafin of Oyo would have legitimacy 
regardless of what any government decided, by virtue of the fact that they are 
both heirs to sovereign states that long predated the arrival of the British, and 
to which a great many people continue to feel more loyalty than to “Nigeria” 
itself (p. 2). 
Checks and balances also exist in traditional institutions that largely prevented 
traditional rulers from becoming authoritarian. A further strength of indigenous 
institutions is their informal approach to conflict resolution and the administration of 
justice. It is a system that works effectively and at low cost.  
Developmental successes resulting from the integration of traditional 
institution/indigenous knowledge is leading to increased support within government, 
as in Ghana and Botswana. Most traditional organisations have sound administrative 
knowledge and are development oriented. They are very active in mobilising their 
people to initiate and implement self-help projects as well as facilitating the 
implementation of state projects. Owusu (2006) posits that: 
In Ghana chiefs and their traditional bodies are given responsibilities for 
mobilising support for local development projects aimed at improving living 
standards. As natural leaders and symbol of unity of the people, a chief is 
barred from taking part in active politics; accordingly any chief wishing to do 
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so and seeking election to parliament must abdicate his or her traditional 
office. As in the case of Botswana, Owusu pointed out that in Botswana as in 
Ghana, chiefs and traditional bodies enjoy constitutional guarantee and 
protection, and perform important functions contributing to the stability of the 
state and welfare of the citizens (pp. 34-5). 
The motivation of traditional institutions and leaders chiefs is captured in this 
comments from the Chief of the Ho-Asogli a traditional area of the Volta region:  
Our predecessors led our ancestors to war with the objective of territorial 
security but today we are faced with a new kind of exigency – the need to 
wage a relentless battle against poverty, ignorance and disease, which must be 
fought in unity (Osei-Tutu 2004, p.9). 
Ho-Asogli was describing the important role of traditional leaders in mobilising, 
disseminating information, and resolving conflicts. He explained how his courts have 
resolved over 400 cases since his accession, which would otherwise have been 
bogged down in the modern legal system. He suggested that the absence of traditional 
system in Cote D’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia may well have played a part in the 
emergence of conflict in those countries. He has been a strong advocate for a pivotal 
role for traditional systems of governance, and has provided an example through his 
numerous charitable activities, including HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns and his 
educational fund which has provided scholarships to more than 2000 people, 
including doctoral candidates. He declared that while the traditional system was not a 
panacea for Africa’s challenges, he argued that they should be part of the solution. 
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As Nwaka (2004) has observed, this concept of institutional reconciliation can be 
given practical support in urban governance by consciously trying to integrate the 
vast urban informal sector to the economic and administrative mainstream; and by 
encouraging and utilizing informal urban neighbourhood associations, not only for 
the well known functions of local security and solidarity, but also as active agents for 
governance and development (p.387).  
The approach advocated by Dia and his group sees institutional reconciliation 
resulting neither in institutionalising or disuse of the informal institutions, nor 
solidifying the formal institutions, but integrating and encouraging coherence 
between adopted formal institutions and rejuvenated informal, indigenous 
institutions. Although there are variations in the administration style of these 
traditional institutions in every region, their activities are similar in terms of 
providing services to their communities. As Dodson (2003) has explained:  
Each community will have to find a common feature between the type of 
governing structure and processes it develops, and the culturally-based 
standards and values of its members about who should hold power, how it 
should properly be exercised, how decisions-making and disputes should be 
handled, and how the different rights of different community members should 
be recognised and protected (p.6).           
In a developed political system, the practical approach is to redesign existing national 
structures into relevant political blocks to which a political input that would serve as 
growth parameter is developed and implemented for a specific result. In this vein, 
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such a practical political approach would seek to identify the obstacles to good 
administrative governance, and restructure or remove them entirely so as to facilitate 
smooth administration.  
Elaborating further, Dia argues that although there are some areas where the informal 
institutions will not be readily at hand, in many cases there will be a need for an 
initiative of finding adaptable formal institutions that are amenable to reconciliation 
activities with renovating indigenous institutions to achieving institutional 
convergence.  
Reconciliation between indigenous and formal institutions is an exercise that brings 
together dominant societal values of indigenous culture on one hand, and technical 
and organisational ideologies supporting modern institutions on the other. For 
reconciliation to take place and bring about convergence, development programs and 
initiatives need to approach institutions the prime medium of development efforts as 
social entities with established value structures and organisational preferences, and 
not as mere organisational instrumentalities ready to implement externally defined 
objectives. 
Dia further explains that strengthening governance through traditional institutions 
could be strong only if the institutional and legal framework reflects societal norms 
and behaviour, as enshrined in indigenous and informal institutions. Such 
reconciliation between formal and informal or customary institutions has been 
achieved in Botswana and Ghana in the rule of law and land allocation, as well as in 
the interface between the state and local governments. And in the Gambia 
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reconciliation was used to strengthen popular participation and improve the 
responsiveness and relevance of policy.    
As mentioned previously, indigenous development and economic associations have 
demonstrated a great emphasis on responsive, accountability and transparent leaders 
in the community including political office holders. This corresponds with Dia’s view 
that an institutional synergy reform program could be used to remove institutional 
and governance barrier and strengthen accountability of economic management.   
In Nigeria there are no national formal consultation mechanisms where the voice of 
the traditional authorities is included. The means of communication in many 
communities is in native dialects where town-cryers go through the communities to 
disseminate information to the people. Dia gives credence to Institutional 
reconciliation in areas of communication which will serve as a powerful instrument 
of change. As we have seen in the role reserved for information dissemination in the 
reconciliation process, Dia argues that information is of primary importance in giving 
voice to project beneficiaries, thereby boosting empowerment, transparency, and 
legitimacy. Dia further explains that in looking for ways of adapting indigenous 
African channels of information to innovative uses, valuable insights can be gleaned 
from the AM90s findings reported by Hagos (1993). The Hagos research shows how 
the traditional and modern system of communication was blended, thereby converting 
the modern channels into two-way, interactive media where massages were 
assessable to the people in the rural areas.         
6.3 Critics of institutional reconciliation in Nigeria 
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Critics of institutional reconciliation have dismissed the role of an informal sector in 
Nigeria by claiming that the political difficulties in the country are in fact a result of 
traditional institutions. Unobe (1989) advocated the abolition of traditional leadership 
altogether because some traditional ruler were seen as ‘exploiters’ during the colonial 
period. It has also been argued that many traditional rulers continue to use their 
positions to accumulate wealth at the expense of ordinary people. In this vain Yohana 
Madaki argued: 
No traditional ruler of substance has less than about three companies. They 
use fronts to demand for contracts and acquire shares in companies. This is 
why they try to capture or befriend every governor in office. Foreigners use 
them as company directors and they in turn provide land for projects (Sunday 
Champion, October 16 1994, p. 4).   
Some critics of traditional institutions believe they should have no role in modern 
Nigeria because they are patently undemocratic, a source of disorder and an obstacle 
to the development of a modern economy. Oladosu (n.d.), for example, said that the 
traditional kingship was founded on historical injustice and that it has no relevance 
and utility to modern African states.  
There is also the argument that traditional rulers are selective in their commitment to 
their communities. Chinua Achebe, a Nigerian writer, mocked Igbo traditional rulers 
as ‘traders in their stall by day and monarchs at night; city dwellers five days a week 
and traditional village rulers on Saturdays and Sundays’ (1983, p. 48).  
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A cause for concern is the question of whether the appointment of traditional leaders 
can be divorced from politics and the influence of government officials in Nigeria, or 
from the need to have the right heritage. Also there is the possibility Igbos will react 
against the use of traditional institutions as a basis for decentralised administrative 
system, as the system of traditional rulership has not historically been a strong feature 
of their society.  
The counter-argument to critics of traditional rulers is that they govern with the 
assistance of other chiefs and are chosen to rule after much grassroots consultation. 
Their administrative style is guided by unwritten principles and precepts, by past 
events and traditional laws of the land. In other words traditional rulers are just one 
part of the traditional institution considered as a whole. As Agbese (2004) stated: 
In reality, the traditional ruler is merely at the apex of entire panoply of a 
network of indigenous governing systems which include a council of elders, 
titled men/women, age-grade or other similar associations. It is the 
combination of these and other institutions that make up the totality of the 
indigenous political systems (p.13).  
In Nigeria, traditional organisations do not have the more obvious failings of the state 
in that they are relatively accessible to ordinary people and are more relevant to the 
daily lives of most Nigerians, particularly those in the rural areas.  
There is also a counter-argument to the view that the positions of traditional rulers 
might be politicised or only for people with the right lineage. In the last two decades 
of the appointment of traditional rulers in Nigeria has been determined following 
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consideration of experience, knowledge and education, while the appointments are 
highly contested in many communities in Nigeria. This is one of the major reforms in 
traditional institutions in recent years. Agbese (2004) stated: 
Wealthy, powerful and well-known Nigerians continue to show considerable 
interest in traditional rulership by actively contesting to sit on the thrones. In 
recent years, the list of victorious candidates reads like a who-is-who of 
Nigeria: Ibrahim Dasuki as Sultan of Sokoto, Oladele Olashore as Oba of 
Iloko in Ijeshaland, Omo N’Oba Eraduwa, the Oba of Benin, to name a few 
(p. 4). 
Recent developments suggest Igbo society has come to terms with the traditional 
style of rulership. This is reflected in the numbers of politicians or military governors 
paying courtesy calls to traditional Igbo rulers when assigned to states in Igbo 
regions. There is also a trend among those contesting elections in the region to take 
chieftaincy titles to show their familiarity with the culture, values and customs of his 
community. Furthermore, an umbrella home town association, N di Igbo, in the Igbo 
community, is recognised by the state and national governments and has proven to be 
a successful example of how a traditional institution can be integrated into the 
region’s governance.  
Efforts to establish grassroots participation which do not involve traditional 
institutions and leaders often fail as they hold extensive knowledge and concern about 
the actual problems and preferences of the people, and a degree of popular legitimacy 
that the government lacks. When the administrative system is decentralised (both 
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administratively and fiscally) by incorporating the traditional institutions/indigenous 
knowledge attention is more focused on the local communities. Severe penalties 
associated with traditional institutions also serve as a check and which are absent in 
the state-based institutions. Supporting this claim Venson (1995) stated: 
Traditional leadership, in its form before external interference operated on the 
principle of community participation, consultation, consensus and an 
acceptable level of transparency through the village council or open tribal 
consultative meetings. These principles are not too different from the ones, 
which modern democracies prescribe as essential for democracy (p. 2).  
The official transfer of powers from higher to lower levels (decentralisation), the 
dispersal of agents of higher levels of governments into the regions (deconcentration) 
and the withdrawal of government functions (dismantling) does not necessarily 
incorporate the traditional ruler or institutions into the administrative structure. While 
highly centralised systems may work effectively in France and Sweden, this is 
because such systems are built upon a political and cultural history that supports and 
legitimates central rule. These foundations are lacking in Nigeria as they are in many 
post-colonial developing countries. A means of strengthening these foundations in 
Nigeria is by giving constitutional powers to traditional rulers, along with the right to 
participate at the federal level of administration.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that Nigeria has a flawed federal structure and that there is a 
need for decentralisation to provide communities with responsive governments that 
provide for a more equitable distribution of resources and promote greater 
participation in local and national affairs.  
The thesis has also considered the country’s history, particularly its constitutional 
development, and how centralisation under a single constitution in a highly diverse 
nation resulted in ongoing constitutional and regime change, which gradually eroded 
the powers of the traditional institutions and leaders who, nonetheless, still have 
tremendous influence over people’s lives. The various pre-colonial communities were 
bound together legally under one central administrative government by a colonial 
authority which pragmatically implemented a different system of administrative 
governance in each region. Gradually, the highly diverse regions were centralised 
under a single constitution, a processes which slowly eroded the powers of traditional 
social and political institutions. Despite this formal marginalisation, tradiational 
forms of power and authority still hold tremendous influence over the life of the 
people.  
The thesis has examined the major models of decentralisation while highlighting their 
inadequacies in dealing with needs and characteristics of Nigerian society. Nigeria 
has tried to decentralise its administrative system on a number of occasions but has 
always failed due to weak and ineffective institutions. The thesis has recommended 
incorporating traditional institutions in to the state’s administrative structures as a 
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way of strengthening the country’s institutions. These traditional institutions have 
sustained communities through periods of ineffective formal governance. Many 
indigenous institutions are built around a decentralised framework of reciprocal 
relationships that provide checks and balances agains corruption and abuse of power 
by individuals. The introduction of traditional institutions at all levels would bring 
government and services closer to the people and, although there are variations in 
these traditional institutions, they have the capacity to meet federal, state and local 
conditions.  
Furthermore, it has explained how Nigeria’s ethno-religious diversity has intensified 
the struggle for political power and resulted in an unstable political environment with 
a lack of core values around which the political development of the country is 
structured. The thesis therefore proposes a model for decentralisation based on 
‘institutional reconciliation’, which promotes policies that are consistent with the 
ethnic, religion and cultural beliefs of the people.  
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